Tag: Puncak Jaya

Indonesia: Recent outbursts of violence underscore dire need for a rights-based approach to conflict resolution in Papua

http://www.fidh.org/Recent-outbursts-of-violence

Indonesia: Recent outbursts of violence underscore dire need for a rights-based approach to conflict resolution in Papua

 

Paris-Jakarta-Bangkok, 21 September 2011. The recent spike in violent incidents in Papua in July and August underscore the urgent need for Jakarta to re-assess its military approach to solve the situation of unrest in the region and to place the respect for human rights at the heart of conflict resolution policies and practices, said the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor (Imparsial) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) today.

 

Kontras recorded at least ten violent clashes between 5 July to 3 August, 2011[1], involving members of the state security forces and local armed groups. Civilians were injured and killed in some of these clashes. Thirteen Papuans were arrested by the police on 31 August in Kampung Nafri, Abepura, for allegedly causing unrest during a religious ceremony. There were also allegations that these 13 individuals were involved in a shooting incident on 3 August, in which three civilians and one TNI soldier were killed. However, local rights groups pointed out that the police made the arrests without properly investigating and substantiating these allegations. These detainees were reportedly tortured while in police custody.

“Freedoms of expression, association and assembly are routinely violated in Papua, which seriously fuels tensions. Besides, gross human rights abuses, such as acts of torture, remain unaccounted for.” said Poengky Indarti, Executive Director of Imparsial.

“While the use of violence to achieve political and other goals is unacceptable, the heavy military presence and the military-centered approach by Jakarta to Papua’s demand for autonomy serve to sideline human rights and do not provide a viable and peaceful solution to the conflict,” said Souhayr Belhassen, FIDH President.

Another element of Jakarta’s security-centered approach is the strict restriction to access to Papua. As a result, peaceful activities of civil society groups and human rights actors operating in Papua are known to be under extensive surveillance by the Indonesian military. This form of intimidation goes against the United Nations Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups or Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and oversteps the lawful limit of intelligence gathering. Internal documents of the Indonesian military recently obtained and publicized by the media revealed both the extent of this kind of surveillance and the military authorities’ mistrust towards peaceful civil society and human rights activities, which they perceive as a threat to national security.

“Monitoring human rights work is seen by the military as threatening to national security and this bodess ill for the safety of human rights defenders and other peaceful activists in Papua, as they could bear the brunt of harassment and physical intimidation by state security forces under the pretext of fighting separatism,” said Yap Swee Seng, Executive Director of FORUM-ASIA.

Some of the activists and individuals named in the leaked military documents have already faced arrest, detention, and intimidation, such as independence activists Filep Karma and Buchtar Tabuni, who were both arrested and convicted for their role in organizing peaceful demonstrations during which the Morning Star flag, a banned symbol, was raised.

A recent report released by Imparsial estimates that there are more than 14,000 military personnel deployed to Papua. The report identifies the key features of such a military-centered approach by the central government, including the continuous military operations in Papua without adequate parliamentary oversight, deployment of a large number of non-organic troops to Papua, and the addition of new territorial command structure in the region.

In sum, accountability for human rights abuses perpetrated by state security forces is still lacking in Papua. In addition, in the few rare cases in which perpetrators were brought to court, they were either acquitted or convicted on lesser charges that do not reflect the gravity of their crimes, such as acts of torture.

The four organizations call on the Indonesian government to:

  • Instruct its military to immediately cease all unlawful surveillance activities in Papua and revise its current draft intelligence bill by incorporating recommendations by civil society and bringing it into line with the Indonesian Constitution and Criminal Procedure Code, as well as international human rights law;
  • Take steps to reduce the heavy presence of non-organic military personnel and their involvement in civil administration in Papua and seriously implement security sector reform;
  • Fully and credibly investigate all past and new allegations of human rights abuses, especially those perpetrated by state security forces, and promptly bring perpetrators to justice;
  • Strengthen civilian oversight and rigorous parliamentary scrutiny of military policies, operations and budget; and
  • Respect the role of human rights defenders and ensure unfettered access to Papua by civil society groups and actors, including foreign and domestic journalists and independent human rights monitors.

[1] The documented violent incidents occurred in Kampong Kalome, Tingginambut district, Puncak Jaya (5 July and 12 July); Mulia, Puncak Jaya (13 July and 21 July); Timika, Mimika (30 July); Illga district, Puncak (30-31 July); Kampung Nafri, Abepura (1 August and 3 August); and Mulia, Puncak Jaya/Wamena (3 August). See documentation by KontraS: http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal=siaran_pers&id=1339.

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An Indonesian War of ‘Unknown Persons’

By AUBREY BELFORD

Published: August 26, 2011

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/world/asia/27iht-papua27.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all

JAKARTA — It is a seemingly unending conflict in a part of the world famous for both its awesome remoteness and the incredible wealth on and beneath the ground.

For half a century, Indonesian troops and police officers have fought a shadowy and sporadic war in the vast forests and highlands of Papua, as the western end of New Guinea is known, after taking control of the former Dutch colony in the 1960s. It is a long-running conflict that is poorly understood by even those involved.

On one level, the fight is between security forces and ragtag groups of indigenous separatists, armed with guns, spears and arrows.

Sometimes, it is alleged, it is factions of the security forces fighting among themselves, drawn into competition over the ill-gotten spoils of a region of vast natural resources, including some of the world’s richest mines. Often, official references to those doing the killing go no further than “unknown persons,” leaving their identity — agents provocateurs, business rivals or guerrillas — the stuff of conspiracy theories.

But after an outburst of violence in recent months that has killed dozens, Indonesia is coming under renewed calls to solve a conflict, replete with economic misery and human rights abuses, that has tainted the country’s image as an emerging democratic giant.

A report this week by the International Crisis Group, an independent research organization, is the latest in a series of calls by civil society groups for a renewed dialogue between Papuans, who are ethnically distinct from other Indonesians and many of whom favor independence, and officials in Jakarta, who see the region as an inviolable part of Indonesia.

At issue are special autonomy arrangements put in place a decade ago by the administration of former President Megawati Sukarnoputri to head off renewed calls for independence following the 1998 fall of the Suharto dictatorship. Suharto ruled Papua with an iron fist while making billions for Jakarta from its natural wealth.

Special autonomy devolved some power to Papuans and saw the creation of local governments and the pumping of huge sums of money back into the region. The government also, controversially, split Papua into two separate provinces, Papua and West Papua.

But the report argues that special autonomy has so far failed to solve the roots of the conflict. Deep poverty persists, as does chronic corruption.

Non-Papuan migrants from other parts of Indonesia dominate the economy.

And, importantly, there remains a sense among Papuans that Indonesian security forces remain a law unto themselves, killing and torturing with near impunity.

“The government of President Yudhoyono, on Papua as on everything else, has been glacially slow to develop a policy that would be different from the default response of throwing cash at the problem and hoping it will go away,” the report by the crisis group said.

While democratic Indonesia has made huge strides in solving bloody wars of separatism and intercommunal conflict in provinces like Aceh and Maluku, Papua has stood out as a weeping sore.

Recent violence exposes the complexity of the conflict. The past two months have seen a rash of attacks in the highland district of Puncak Jaya, one of the poorest and remotest areas of Indonesia and a hot spot for a local insurgency led by a faction of the separatist Free Papua Movement, or TPN-OPM.

This month, a helicopter carrying a shot and dying soldier was hit by rebel bullets in the region and, last week, a motorcycle taxi driver was shot and killed in the district capital by “unknown persons,” said Lt. Col. Alex Korwa, the local police chief.

Over the hills, in Puncak, another district created as part of the government’s special autonomy plan, fighting between indigenous clans over control of the local government left 17 dead in late July.

This month, five people, including two soldiers, were killed in separate incidents near Jayapura, the capital of Papua Province. A series of other gunfights and stabbings have continued throughout Papua over this period.

The authorities have, mostly, pointed the finger at the TPN-OPM for the deadliest of the Jayapura attacks, an ambush in which four people were killed. But Papuan independence campaigners assert that elements of the security forces, or their clients, are behind many such attacks.

“These attacks I think have been carried out either by militias, or the military themselves, as violence to create an atmosphere of fear,” said Benny Giay, a pastor in the Gospel Tabernacle Church. The commander of military forces in Papua, Maj. Gen. Erfi Triassunu, said the attack near Jayapura was “purely the TPN-OPM.”

Mr. Giay also alleged that a Papuan farmer, Das Komba, was abducted and killed by soldiers near the border with Papua New Guinea on Friday, but the police and military have so far not commented on the case.

Cases in which members of the security forces received light sentences for the torture and murder of civilians have caused outrage in recent months, but the crisis group argues in its report that the fact such trials exist at all is a step forward.

With Papua thousands of kilometers from Jakarta, and tightly sealed from foreign journalists and many rights groups, it is difficult to confirm independently claims and counterclaims about much of the violence. For those on the ground, too, many attacks remain mysterious.

“How can we trust the police or the military if there are no perpetrators, if no one gets caught?” asked Latifah Anum Siregar, the director of the Democracy Alliance for Papua, a human rights group.

“Police will send out 200, 300 people on a sweep, but they won’t get anyone.”

One senior police officer who has had command roles in Papua’s hot spots said that even he was often uncertain who exactly was behind attacks — rebels or rogue soldiers. “We weren’t sure,” said the officer, who declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the subject. “Every time we got a glance of the shooter, they always disappeared really quickly into the jungle.”

Realizing the drawbacks of special autonomy, the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has pledged to put together a temporary body, called the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua, to seek solutions to corruption, poverty and rights abuses in the region, but its formation has been delayed.

“There’s a lot of mistrust by the people in Papua, both towards the government in Jakarta and their own regional governments,” said Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a political science professor at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences who is involved in setting up the body.

But building trust may take more than building schools. Many Papuans remain fiercely committed to independence, arguing that the process by which Indonesia achieved sovereignty over Papua in 1969 — a vote by 1,025 Papuan elders handpicked by the Indonesian authorities — was flawed.

Indonesia is similarly inflexible. Simply unfurling the region’s Morning Star independence flag can be considered subversion, a crime punishable by up to 20 years or life in prison. About two dozen people are in jail or awaiting trial in Papua on subversion charges, according to Human Rights Watch.

Amid violence earlier this month, thousands of people protested in Papuan towns and cities to demand a referendum on independence. The political affairs minister, Djoko Suyanto, was firm in his response. “Papua is a part of the unitary republic of Indonesia,” he said. “That is what we must maintain.”

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Comments on ICGs Hope and Hard Reality in Papua:

Comments on

Hope and Hard Reality in Papua: An Update Briefing on the conflict in West Papua by the International Crisis Group (22 August 2011)

(ICG full PDF report available at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B126-indonesia-hope-and-hard-reality-in-papua.aspx )

Jason MacLeod 23 August 2011

 

 

Introduction

The recent ICG report into conflict in West Papua, Hope and Hard Reality in Papua highlights the growing strength of the civilian based movement in Papua. It also points to contradictory developments. On the one hand there is an opening of political space, illustrated by the fact that the conference happened at all and that no topic was off the table. On the other hand, the report details ongoing violence in Puncak Jaya, demonstrating that the presence of the security forces only exacerbates violence as well as highlighting the enduring appeal of armed struggle by a small and hardcore group of Papuans. Hope and Hard Reality in Papua also outlines 44 “indicators of peace” developed during the conference. While still partial these indicators give tangible content to Papuan aspirations for freedom. This content echoes many of the demands made by Papuan youth, student, women’s groups, farmers, pastors, and Adat groups in recent years. Indicators like the “freedom of expression” and “the release of all political prisoners” bring into sharp focus the fact that Papua still remains an nondemocratic enclave of the Republic of Indonesia.

 

Summary of the report

The recent ICG report on West Papua, Hope and Hard Reality is structured in three sections: the peace conference held in Jayapura in early July 2011; an analysis of the recent spike in violence in the remote and rugged Puncak Jaya district in the highlands of West Papua; and, an evaluation of the extent to which a series of indicators developed during the peace conference could be used to resolve the conflict in Puncak Jaya. The report underscores a key policy recommendation currently sitting on the Cabinet Secretary desk – that the long-delayed new Unit to accelerate development in Papua, Unit Percepatan Pembangunan di Papua dan Papua Barat, known by its Indonesian acronym as UP4B, include a mandate to address political as well economic issues.

The report underscores an opportunity and threat. The opportunity is that there are some key high-level Indonesian allies, including advisors to the Indonesian government and a former Indonesian military officer, who understand that a political as well as economic solution to Papua’s problems is needed. The threat is two-fold. The first is that security operations continue in Papua. This is despite an extraordinary admission by Major-General (Ret.) TB Hassunuddin, deputy head of the Indonesian Government’s parliamentary Commission 1 responsible for security affairs, that all current operations to “hunt down OPM leaders are … illegal”. According to Hasunuddin this is because they do not carry the consent of parliament as stipulated by Law 34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces. The General’s comments illustrate the lack of political will in Jakarta to rein-in the security forces in Papua. This last point relates to the second threat, summarised in the ICG report as “Jakarta’s indifference to indigenous Papuan concerns”.

The Papua Peace Conference and indicators of a peaceful Papua developed during the Conference

The Peace Conference was organised by the Jaringan Damai Papua or Papua Peace Network, a group organised by Dr. Neles Tebay or Pater (Father) Neles Tebay as he is known, and Muridan Widjojo, an Indonesian scholar with the Indonesian Institution of Sciences (LIPI) who was the editor of the Papua Road Map published in 2009. Tebay and Widjojo were previously involved in separate dialogue initiatives but have now decided to combine their efforts. The JDP itself is made up of key individuals, all members of different Papuan civil society groups, but attending as individuals not as representatives of their group or organisation. Both migrants and indigenous Papuans are members.

For me, three things stand out about the conference and the ICG’s summary report on the conference.

The first is that it happened at all. It was neither prevented from occurring by the military nor disrupted by protests. It was also attended by a senior minister of the Yudhuyono’s government, Djoko Sujanto, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Law, and twenty senior bureaucrats from the various ministries that Sujanto coordinates. This in itself is a sign, albeit a small one, that the Indonesian president may be paying more attention to Papua.

Second, the conference clearly underscored Papuans desire for independence. This can be seen in the final declaration of the conference which outlined a criterion for negotiators and nominated five Papuan Diaspora negotiators, all from the Pro-Independence camp, as well as from an incident during the conference itself. When the Provincial Army Chief of Staff, Erfi Triassunu got up to speak he invited the participants – who were virtually all Papuans – to chant “Papua damai” (Peaceful Papua). Instead the crowd responded as one: “Papua Merdeka!” (Free Papua!). Perhaps not the response the General anticipated.

Third, although the report does not dwell on this, it does suggest that there are still key sectors of the Papuan population that are still not actively engaged in the struggle. These are Papuan politicians, the civil service (who the report acknowledges are engaging in a kind of passive noncooperation illustrated by the fact that in Puncak Jaya for instance, only 30 or an approximate 2000 strong workforce even show up for work); workers, particularly those in the resource extractive industries; and members of church congregations.

Fourth, and this is the most significant in my view, is that the conference produced a list of indicators of a peaceful Papua. Together these indicators are the clearest articulation of the “contents” of a New Papua that we have ever seen. Not only do they constitute a vision of tomorrow they may have important implications for the civil resistance movement. The ICG report argues that the indicators could be used to formulate policy direction for the central and provincial governments. The word “indicators” reflects the language of government and aid and development donors. However, many of the indicators mirror (and in some cases refine) an emerging set of campaign objectives that civil resistance leaders might organise around. In some cases, such as freeing political prisoners, Papuans they are already organising for change. Papuan activists could well use the “indicators” to pursue, and even set, the agenda for change.

 

Armed Struggle

The report also devotes significant attention to violent insurgency in the Puncak Jaya region by one of the few active units of the TPN-PB (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional di Papua Barat or the West Papuan National Liberation Army). Five things are worth highlighting from the report. First, Papuan guerrillas in Puncak Jaya, and elsewhere in West Papua are poorly armed. The report estimates that Goliat Tabuni’s group in Puncak Jaya has about 30 guns. This reflects the assessment of the armed struggle contained in the recently released Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces) document leaked by the Sydney Morning Herald. Second, there are very low levels of participation in the armed struggle. Although virtually the entire indigenous population of Puncak Jaya has kinship connections with the TPN there are only a handful of active members. Third, the violence is not just one-sided or in response to Indonesian military attacks. Tabuni and his men, and in some cases other aspiring commanders also initiate attacks on the Indonesian military, not in direct response to Military violence, but to increase their own reputation and prestige.  Fourth, Tabuni’s group itself is split into three leadership groups which are sometimes compete and clash with one another. This reflects the fractious state of the TPN elsewhere in Papua.  Finally, the ICG report makes it very clear that violence in Puncak Jaya, some of which is also linked to inter-clan competition, is exacerbated by the presence of the security forces.

Theories of Change

Although it is not picked up in the report, Hope and Hard Reality in Papua underscores a battle of ideas underway in Papua. This discussion is essentially about how change (freedom) will be won. It is less a contest between armed struggle and peaceful ways of resolving the conflict. Despite the spike in violence (most of which was perpetrated by the security forces) there is little popular support for armed struggle. The contest is mostly between and within proponents of two different competing theories of change: those who believe dialogue, negotiation or other conventional political processes will secure Papuan aspirations for freedom and those who advocate mass mobilisation or civil resistance. The majority of Papuans still invest in the hope that conventional political processes – either diplomacy (by Papuan representatives of various resistance groups), an inclusive dialogue process of the kind envisioned by Tebay/Widjojo and the JDP, or a legal challenge to Indonesian government sovereignty in Papua – will be able to resolve the conflict. I don’t think there is any real indication that these acts of persuasion will compel Jakarta to sit at the table.

On the civil resistance side are Papuans who argue that a conventional political process is naïve. This group claims that Jakarta will only make key concessions when they are compelled to do through mass nonviolent disruptions that raise the political and economic costs of the status quo. Within the civil resistance camp there is also a subtle difference between those whose methods are based around street protests and those who are seeking to organise a much broader base and support them to be active through a much more diverse range of nonviolent tactics than demonstrations.

The fact that KNPB (Komite Nasional Papua Barat or the West Papua National Committee) organised a demonstration attended by thousands on 2 August in support of an conference about a legal challenge to the Act of Free Choice that was happening in Oxford at the same time, shows that there is growing understanding that a conventional political strategy needs a mass movement. Although, there are still widely held unrealistic expectations that dialogue and/or a legal strategy will bring about independence in the near future.

Then there is also tension around goals. The radical student and youth groups, WPNA (West Papua National Authority) and KNPB, as well as Benny Wenda in London (who heads up the International Lawyers for West Papua, the group who is spearheading the legal challenge) are pushing for a referendum. They see the JDP and calls for peaceful dialogue in opposition to the demand for a referendum. Despite these real differences and tensions the report (and recent events inside Papua) suggest that there is growing recognition that a mass movement and dialogue are not incompatible. Some are starting to say that civil resistance helps creates the conditions for dialogue. In fact the report seems to suggest that last year’s occupation of the Provincial Parliament in Jayapura helped widen the proposed mandate of the UP4B.

Allies

The ICG report also demonstrates that there are is a small but influential group of allies inside Indonesia who while not countenancing independence for Papua, do support real and significant political changes. In addition the report mentions but does not dwell on the fact that there are key non-Papuans inside Papua (who are members of the JDP) that support Papuan political goals.

Conclusion

The report illustrates the growing maturity of the civilian based movement inside Papua. The development of 44 indicators of a peaceful Papua around the themes of politics, law and human rights, economics and environment, security, and social-cultural rights all point to a closer linkage between civil resistance and conflict resolution approaches to change in Papua. The belief that civil resistance is not in conflict with but rather supports dialogue was made by Chris Waranussy, a prominent human rights lawyer in Papua. The most significant thing about the recent peace conference in Jayapura is that it has supported Papuans to more fully articulate the contents of freedom. It also underscores the mainstream Papuan desire for independence. In this sense the gulf between different positions in Jakarta and Jayapura, and the different perceptions of the problems in Papua, remains wide. A fact illustrated by what is going on in Puncak Jaya and the Indonesian military’s response.

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Violence Continues in Papua, Soldier Murdered

(West Papua Media Note: this type of brazen attack bears strong similarities in its conduct  to the stabbing of journalist Banjir Ambarita in early 2011, elements of the August 1 attack at Nafri, the delivery of a bomb on June 28 to the KumHAM office in Kotaraja,  and many years of so-called “ninja” attacks from motorbikes that Papuan civilians have suffered for years. It is absolutely critical for the TNI to be fully transparent with this investigation, and not blame Papuans immediately without CREDIBLE for an attack that bears all the hallmarks of Indonesian Islamist violence (especially in the use of the sword), or factional violence between members of the security forces involved in illegal business activities) .

http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/violence-continues-in-papua-soldier-murdered/461024

Violence Continues in Papua, Soldier Murdered
Jakarta Globe | August 23, 2011


An Indonesian Military officer stationed in Papua was stabbed to death by unknown attackers on Tuesday.

Capt. Tasman, 53, from the Cenderawasih XVII Military Regional Command, was on his way to work when the attack took place near a housing complex on Jalan Baru in Heram, Jayapura.

A Cenderawasih University student who witnessed the incident told Suara Pembaruan that he was riding a motorbike behind Tasman when two men approached him.

One man used a knife to stab him repeatedly and the other one used a sword. Tasman fell to the ground and the men ran away.

Kiki reported the attack to a nearby police precinct but Tasman was already dead when police arrived at the scene.

He had been stabbed or slashed in the neck, back and stomach.

Neither the police nor the military in Papua were willing to comment regarding the latest attack in the region.

On Aug. 3, suspected Papua separatists attacked an Army helicopter in Jayawijaya district as it evacuated the body of a soldier they had allegedly killed, police said.

A few days before, the town of Mulia was rocked by two separate shootings that targeted police and military offices, wounding one soldier. On July 29, police said 16 rebel fighters engaged in a fire-fight with police in Paniai district. In the same month, two other shooting incidents left four soldiers dead.

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Security measures escalate in Papua

Bintang Papua, 20 August 2011

KNPB, the National Committee for West Papua, is scheduled to announce
the results of the meeting organised by ILWP, International Lawyers for
West Papua in Oxford, at 9am this morning , at the tomb of Theys Hiyo
Eluay.

Bintang Papua also reported that Major-General Erfi Triassumu, commander
of the XXVII/Cendrawasih Military Command, said he has not yet had any
reports about the results of the ILWP meeting in Oxford, but said that
the ILWP event has triggered events affecting the security situation,
especially in Papua.

In a meeting with the press, he said that promises made by various
groups were causing confusion among the population. It was not only
because of the armed activities of civilian groups that had occurred
before and after the ILWP meeting. The security situation had indeed
intensified throughout Papua recently, which had happened both before
and after the ILWP meeting.

Other factors were the election of the governor of Papua as well as the
special autonomy law – OTSUS. People were hoping that OTSUS funds would
be evenly distributed among the communities, although some of the funds
could not yet be released.

He said that he along with the police chief in Papua had together
committed to doing what they could to restore a conducive situation in
Papua.

Meanwhile, the district chief of Puncak Jaya, Lukas Emenbe. called on
everyone whatever their differing opinions to hold a dialogue in order
to agree on peaceful solutions. ‘ All these problems can be resolved,’
he said, ‘as long as we publicly express our opinions.’

The military commander, asked whether there would be an increase in the
number of troops in preparation for the forthcoming Idul Fitri [the last
two days of Ramadan] said that organic troops may carry out routine
movements because the Korem under Battalion 751 in Sentani does not
have special units available for security purposes.

Asked about the manoeuvres by armed groups which had been involved in
fighting in urban areas such as in Nafri, he said because of the current
civil emergency status, the police would be in the front line together
with the local government, because the govrnor, the district chief and
the city mayor are the ones who are responsible for security.’

‘I will assist if there is a request from the police for additional
personnel to help the police,’ he said.

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