Civilian groups being armed by Indon Govt in Papua, says human rights activist

1 June 2012

West Papuan human rights activist, Sebby Sambom has declared that the Indonesian government has armed  a group of civilian personnel in Papua which have been armed armed in order to  carry out actions like the shooting of a foreign visitor, in order to damage the reputation of Papuan people in the outside world.’

He said that the shooting of the German, Dietmar Pieper, was part of a political conspiracy  of the Indonesian government  to undermine international opinion regarding the  People people, claiming that the perpetrator of the shooting was by someone from the OPM or  its armed wing, Tentara Pembebasan Papua.

‘The government has decided upon this conspiracy, now that the international community is paying greater attention to Papua, as was the case at a UN session on 23 May this year. The shooting was clearly the work of a Papuan who is now in the pay of the Indonesian government,’ said Sambom, who has spent time in prison as a political prisoner.

This can be proven, he said, by the fact that the Indonesians have armed some indigenous Papuans who have now decided to ally themselves with the Indonesians. He also drew attention to the emergence of other pro-NKRI groups in Papua such as the Barisan Merah Putih – the Red-and-White Brigade –  which is trying to stir up conflict in Papua.

‘I have proof of the fact that some Papuans have been armed by the government. I have in my possession the licences of some Papuan people who own guns and I am willing to show this evidence to someone from media or to the general public,’ he said.

This is all part of attempts being made to  discredit the struggle of the Papuan people in the eyes of the international community.

Sambom said that it was very important to exert presure pressure on the Gernan govermnet to adopt a firm stand with regard the shooting of one of its citizens here on Indonesian territory. ‘The German government should press for an independent team to be set up to investigate who was responsible for this shooting,’ said Sambom.

Translated by TAPOL

LP3BH: Military Intelligence Operations are still underway in Papua

Statement by Yan Christian Warinussy, Executive-Director of LP3BH,  Papua[Translated by TAPOL]

The appointment and deployment of Major-General Mohammad Erwin Syafitri (former deputy chief of BAIS, Indonesia’s joint strategic intelligence  agency) as commander of KODAM XVII Cenderawasih Papua is clear proof that the Land of Papua is still an area of operations of Indonesian military intelligence.

As a result, the top leadership of the military territorial command in this region has been placed under the command of a leader who has a background in intelligence or at the very least a history of involvement in Indonesia’s intelligence agency.

This is important in order to protect the collaboration between military activities or security and intelligence which acts as the front line for gathering information and deploying security forces in the area.

It is important to point out that in the opinion of human rights activists in Papua, the Land of Papua is still isolated from the international community, bearing in mind that access to the area has been made difficult for several humanitarian and human rights institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Peace Brigades International, as a result of which they have closed their offices in Papua and left Indonesia in November last year.

The same goes too with regard to the presence of international observers as well as foreign journalists. And for the past five years, it has been difficult for foreign diplomats based in Jakarta to gain access to Papua. This situation  has come about because of the powerful influence of the Indonesian army – TNI – and the Indonesian police, so as to make it more difficult for international observation of developments with regard to the rule of law and basic human rights in the Land of Papua.

As a human rights defender in the Land of Papua, I see a close connection with  the upsurge in demands being made by the Papuan people  to the Indonesian government to find a solution to a number of problems by means of a Papua-Indonesia dialogue, as an important theme which is continually being confronted by certain elements, such as the TNI and the Indonesian police, both of whom have their own vested interests in the Land of Papua.

Bearing in mind that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stated on 9 November 2011 that he is ready to enter into dialogue with all forces in the Land of Papua, I have not yet seen  any response to this from TNI or from the Indonesian police, to indicate whether they agree with this or indeed whether they support the wishes of the President.

Although in this connection, the military commander and the chief of police of Papua said in their presentations to the Papuan Peace Conference on 5-7 July 2011 that they too support dialogue as the way to solve the conflict in the Land of Papua.

I believe that the Indonesian army and police must clearly reveal their attitude towards the question of dialogue.which is what the vast majority of Papuans support, along with their non-Papuan brothers here in Papua. Even the central government in Jakarta is supporting this, which is clear from the fact that President SBY  has appointed Deputy President Boediono to take the lead in efforts to prepare the way for this Papua-Indonesia dialogue.

The idea of dialogue has moreover won positive support from a number of countries around the world, including the USA, Australia, Germany, the UK and the European Union, all of whom are close allies of Indonesia and support the territorial integrity  of the Republic of Indonesia.

6 February 2012

Supporting Accountability, Not Separatism, in Indonesia

Elaine Pearson

Deputy Asia Director, Human Rights Watch

What do US Senator Dianne Feinstein, Senator Patrick Leahy, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu have in common? Their names appear among 248 foreign politicians, government officials, academics and journalists the Indonesian military views as “supporters of Papuan separatists.”

The list appears among 500 pages of Indonesian military documents, which recently came to light, that provide an insider view of the military’s surveillance operations in Papua. the country’s easternmost province.

Most of the documents concern the activities of Indonesia’s Special Forces, or Kopassus. The US should be paying close attention since a year ago it restored full military ties with Kopassus, which had been suspended for years because of the force’s notorious human rights record.

Officially, Kopassus operates in Papua to monitor and suppress the Papuan separatist movement, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or OPM), which has been engaged in an armed struggle against the Indonesian government since the 1960s. The documents show, however, that the focus of Indonesian military operations in Papua goes far beyond the roughly 1,000 poorly armed rebels and includes a broad swathe of Papuan political, traditional, and religious leaders, and civil society groups who are spied on by a vast network of Papuan informants.

The documents show that the military believes it has more to fear from peaceful “political separatist” activity than from armed separatists. A 2007 Kopassus report states, “Current political activity in Papua is very dangerous compared to the activities of Papuan armed groups because their access already reaches abroad.”

The problem, as the documents make clear, is that pretty much anyone who challenges authority is automatically deemed a separatist. A couple of years ago I met a Papuan family from Jayapura, the provincial capital, who were pro-Indonesia. They told me how their son had taken a romantic stroll on a nearby beach with his girlfriend when they were set upon by eight naval officers, who beat him up and forced the pair to engage in humiliating sexual acts. The family tried to complain to the police and to the naval base to no avail. The youth’s cousin told me, “I am a Papuan woman and an Indonesian citizen. We are not separatists, but whenever anyone tries to stand up for their rights, they are called separatists – that’s how they silence us.”

The reports indicate that Kopassus believes nongovernmental organizations primarily work to discredit the Indonesian government and the armed forces by using the “human rights issue” to garner international condemnation of Indonesia’s military presence in Papua and to promote Papuan independence.

Human Rights Watch has long documented violations by Indonesian security forces in Papua. For years, the military denied the reports of human rights violations in Papua, even when faced with overwhelming evidence. This lack of accountability gives security forces a green light to commit abuses against the local population. However, the recent growth in cell phone video is making it more difficult to deny abuses.

Last year, a film uploaded to YouTube showed soldiers brutally torturing two farmers in Papua, kicking them, threatening one with a knife to his face, and repeatedly jabbing the other in the genitals with burning wood. A prolonged international outcry finally forced the military to take action. In the end, three soldiers got light sentences for “disobeying orders” rather than torture. It is unclear whether the military has discharged any of them. Two months earlier, soldiers from the same battalion shot and killed Rev. Kinderman Gire on the suspicion he was a separatist. At the trial, the defendants claimed Gire led them to believe he was a member of OPM and tried to grab a rifle from one of them, who then shot him in the chest. They dumped the body in a river, after trying to cut off his head. Last week a military tribunal convicted three soldiers, again only for “disobeying orders,” and sentenced them to six, seven and fifteen months in prison.

Indonesia’s military has heralded such light sentences for torture and killing as “appropriate.” Perhaps this is not surprising given a US Defense Department official characterized the prosecution of the video torture case as “progress.”

Last year, when resuming full military ties, then-US Defense Secretary Robert Gates described how Indonesia’s defense minister “publicly pledged to protect human rights and advance human rights accountability and committed to suspend from active duty military officials credibly accused of human rights abuses, remove from military service any member convicted of such abuses, and cooperate with the prosecution of any members of the military who have violated human rights.”

The revelations in the military documents don’t appear to have changed any thinking inside the Indonesian armed forcesResponding to recent articles about the documents, an Indonesian military spokesman told the Jakarta Post: “There is no such thing as a repressive or militant approach. What we do is always a welfare approach, where we help Papuans have better lives.”

And the old pattern of military denials continues. Where individual cases garner international attention, the Indonesian military has understood that all it needs to do to continue receiving US military funding is to slap soldiers on the wrist for “disobeying orders” rather than prosecute them for serious crimes. The US has conveyed multiple messages of disappointment to the Indonesian government and military on individual cases such as the video torture trial. But US unwillingness to impose significant consequences, such as suspending new military cooperation, tells the Indonesians and others that the US doesn’t insist on sticking to its standards.

The US should call on the Indonesian government to fully disclose all military tribunal cases involving alleged abuses against civilians, including prosecutions for “disobeying orders,” and provide transcripts to the public. Until the Indonesian government re-examines these cases, in line with the US Leahy law, which prevents the US from cooperating with abusive military units, the US government should not participate in joint endeavors with military personnel or units working in Papua. The US should also call on Indonesia’s military to stop viewing peaceful political activists as threats to national security and stop spying on them.

Both the US and Indonesia should recognize that people like Senator Leahy, who are named in the Papua military documents, were not seeking to challenge Indonesian sovereignty, but simply to defend the international standards for accountability that the Indonesian military is undermining.

Elaine Pearson is the deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. Follow Elaine Pearson onTwitter.

Anatomy of an Occupation: The Indonesian Military in West Papua

Full Report is available for download and distribution as a pdf Anatomy of an Occupation: The Indonesian Military in West Papua

and the Secret report is available Here

By Jim Elmslie and Camellia Webb-Gannon, with Peter King

Report for the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS), The University of Sydney, August 2011

Executive Summary

This report deals with a series of Indonesian military documents that were passed to the West Papua Project (WPP) in early 2011.[1] The documents provide remarkable insights into how the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional IndonesiaTNI), operates within the disputed territory of West Papua (disputed, that is, between the vast majority of Papuans and the Indonesian government), and how they view West Papuan civil society. The documents reveal the names and activities of Indonesian intelligence agents; describe how traditional Papuan communities are monitored; and include a detailed analysis of both the West Papuan armed guerrilla groups and the non-violent civil society organisations which promote self-determination. Identifying so many West Papuan leaders and others as “separatists”, these documents effectively show that support for independence is widespread and surprisingly well organised. West Papuans have long complained of living under an Indonesian military “occupation” and these documents go a long way to Anatomy of an Occupation: The Indonesian Military in West Papuasubstantiating this claim.

The authors of this report have sought to verify information contained in the documents where possible. Much of this information on individuals and Papuan organisations is already well known, although presented here more comprehensively in some respects than ever before. We can therefore be relatively confident that the documents are not fabricated or deliberately misleading, although they do contain inaccuracies, omissions and many obvious examples of false or misleading precision. Names of Indonesian intelligence agents, both Papuan and non-Papuan, are impossible to verify and have been left out of our report. We do believe, however, that the general modus operandi revealed in the documents is a fair representation of how the Indonesian military operates. As many diverse and disputed claims are made about the conflict in West Papua by the Indonesian and other governments, by international commentators and by the Papuans themselves, we believe that this information should be in the public sphere to increase understanding of this little-known, but intense, bitter and long-standing conflict.

The report is split into two sections. The first deals with the 97 slide PowerPoint presentation entitled, Anatomy of Papuan Separatists. The presentation itself can be viewed at This section acts as a running commentary on the slide show, explaining and contextualising what is an intriguing exposition of the West Papuan armed liberation movement and its non-violent civilian counterpart. The forensic details of the Anatomy leave the reader in no doubt as to the level of military scrutiny under which the Papuans live. It shows just how seriously the Indonesian forces take the threat of “separatism”, especially its attempts to reach out to an international audience. The presentation could accurately be renamed as an Anatomy of the Papuan Occupation.

The second section deals with an assortment of other leaked documents that flesh out the day-to-day reality of living under Indonesian occupation. In both images and text the daily tasks of security force members are outlined as they maintain a close surveillance on communities of traditional Papuans. Details of Indonesian agents  – who they are, where they work, what information they can provide – are listed as small links in the heavy chain mesh of an occupation which has at its core the modern practice of “psychological warfare”, PSYOPS. This pernicious system of social control has created a pervasive atmosphere of terror amongst the Papuan population as their lives are manipulated by state actions and threatened with “black operations”. Unsolved, indeed uninvestigated, killings, beatings and rapes occur against a background of a rapidly changing demography as hundreds of thousands of non-Papuan Indonesians move into the province. Predominantly Muslim, the newcomers are adding another layer of tension and fear, as the Muslim-Christian divide widens – taking its cue from the threatened growth of radical Islam in Java and elsewhere.

PSYOPS, as practiced in West Papua, is analysed initially from a general perspective and then from the personal experience of several individual Papuans. As a tool of social control it has been effective in dividing the Papuan people, some of whom now form a Papuan elite that has prospered economically under the bureaucratic “reforms” enacted by the Indonesian government, particularly the creation of two provinces and some 23 new administrative regencies in Papua. However, these documents show that, despite PSYOPS and divide-and-rule administrative policies, there is a high degree of cohesion and unity amongst the West Papuan nationalist majority. Indeed, looking at the Papuan individuals identified in these documents it can be seen that West Papuan nationalism is spread throughout civil society, in the churches, youth groups, customary bodies and political organisations. Far from the desire for self-determination dying out, the younger generation of Papuan leaders is now stridently demanding the rights to which they are entitled by Indonesian law, albeit increasingly as a non-violent, civil resistance movement.

These documents show that Indonesian rule over West Papua can be characterised as an ongoing military/police occupation. Inevitably this involves the systematic infliction of human rights abuses on a civilian population. Our report concludes that Australia should not be co-operating as it does with the TNI elite special forces, Kopassus, because it directly implicates the Australian army and taxpayer in the suffering of the Papuan people. And all Australian military aid to Indonesia should be seriously reconsidered while the military dominated system of occupation persists in Papua. The political and administrative reforms that have benefited so much of Indonesia since 1998 need to be properly implemented in West Papua. Until then West Papua will remain a blight on Indonesia’s international reputation and a place of suffering for its indigenous Melanesian population.

[1] The West Papua Project, at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of Sydney, has operated since 2000 as an academic think tank and research center examining the conflict in West Papua between the indigenous Melanesian people and the Indonesian state and its security forces. During this period the WPP has held many conferences, workshops and briefings, and its affiliates have produced a wide range of publications including books, scholarly articles and reports.


This report is based on a series of documents recently leaked into the public domain that relate to military and intelligence operations in West Papua.[1] The most important is entitled Anatomy of Papuan Separatists and it gives observers unprecedented insight into how the Indonesian army views the situation there. Organised as a confidential briefing document, presumably for senior Indonesian military, political and government figures, it clarifies a situation that is generally regarded as opaque. Other documents relate to the use of Papuan and non-Papuan intelligence agents by the TNI and efforts by soldiers to socialise with Papuan village communities (these documents are analysed in the second section of this report). While the Indonesian government bans foreign journalists and researchers from Papua’s two provinces, now confusingly named Papua and West Papua, in an attempt to block information on the situation from reaching the outside world, here is a case where the Indonesians themselves are providing a frank and comprehensive assessment. While undated, the Anatomy document’s reference to US President Barack Obama suggests it was written, or at least finished, sometime after his election on November 4, 2008.

Anatomy of Papuan Separatists is an extraordinary document in the form of an extended PowerPoint presentation. Produced by the TNI,[2] it is a systematic and detailed analysis of the West Papuan political landscape, mapping who the various actors are and where they fit into a larger picture. Almost every leading West Papuan political and military player is included in this analysis – leaving one with the distinct impression that there is no other game in town except “separatism”. In fact the goal for most of the West Papuan leaders in this analysis is independence, which implies that this is also the desired outcome for the overwhelming majority of the Papuan people. So this document is both a study in “separatism” and a blueprint for a military occupation meant to combat that separatism. Separatism is shown to be not a rare sentiment held by the few, but rather the glue which binds together the West Papuan ethnic and political consciousness. We are given a valuable insight into how West Papua and its Indonesian occupation actually work.

The Anatomy file comprises 97 slides and methodically works through the various ways in which the West Papuans confront the Indonesian state. In broad terms the conflict is split between military and political spheres, with some overlap. Both of these spheres are explored in remarkably frank detail. The military analysis of the “separatist” movement is the most detailed ever undertaken, or at least revealed publicly, and shows just how extensive the armed opposition to Indonesian rule is. The Anatomy document provides details of 31 armed groups of the TPN (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional –the National Liberation Army), the military wing of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka—the Free Papua Movement) that are spread right across the two provinces (Papua and Papua Barat) that constitute the region referred to collectively in this report as West Papua. Rather than being the ragtag bunch of malcontents – which the OPM/TPN are usually portrayed as — this Anatomy shows them to be a relatively cohesive and deeply entrenched resistance army, highly committed to achieving their goal of independence from Indonesia, even though the Anatomy often seems to imply that all the dozens of groups it identifies across a 40 year period are still functioning pretty much as when first identified.

Before proceeding with analysis of the document we have three general comments.

First, we wish to highlight the pervasiveness of the phenomenon of “separatism” as seen from the (Indonesian military) author’s point of view. Demands for dialogue; the “return” of Special Autonomy to Jakarta, and for  demilitarisation, improved human rights, an end to discrimination, economic marginalisation and environmental devastation in West Papua — all amount to only “separatism” in the Anatomy. And separatism is viewed as a legitimate thing for the military to attack; separatists are enemies of the Indonesian state, and therefore enemies of the military and the police. There is no attempt to understand where this sentiment comes from, just to identify its existence to be targeted for destruction. That there are so many separatists does not seem to faze the author(s) of the Anatomy; just to reinforce his (their) sense of mission.

There is little discussion of those Papuans who are not separatists. There are undoubtedly Papuans who have thrown in their lot with Indonesia, one of whom is identified in the Anatomy, Franzalbert Joku. He is the only person of the hundreds listed who has “returned to Indonesia”. Joku is a well-known former independence activist who has given up the struggle as a hopeless cause and works hard to convince other “separatists” to do the same. Later in this report we will explore Joku’s views further as well as those of other prominent Papuans who have eschewed the struggle for freedom.

Second, it is noteworthy that there are so many “separatists” identified in the Anatomy, and that they include so many of the most prominent people from the three generations since the Indonesian takeover of Papua in 1962-3 is striking. While most outside observers dismiss the chance of achieving independence as remote if not impossible, given the power and determination of the Indonesian state and the comparative weakness of the Papuans, many Papuans do not. They are fully committed to the struggle. In fact these documents show that the younger generation, those in their 20s and 30s, are as committed as the older generations. Together the Papuans listed in this document represent most of the current leading figures in West Papuan society. The Anatomy shows how seriously the Indonesian state and military consider the threat of separatism, and indeed it places the people named under grave threat of targeted assassination. Some of them have indeed already been killed since the publication of the document (for instance OPM leader Kelly Kwalik). This has led some informed readers of the Anatomy to describe it as a “hit list” of people targeted for removal.

Thirdly, this document tells us how the Indonesian military views the West Papuan political structure. To an outside observer it is hard to grasp how all the multiple military, social and political Papuan groups relate to each other. Here this complex situation is laid out with surprising clarity: there are traceable lines of authority and engagement — even between various “factions” and geographically isolated groups. One reason that Jakarta has given for refusing to negotiate with the West Papuans over the myriad problems that beset the province is that “we do not know who to negotiate with”.[3] This document undermines that pretext.

[1] These documents have been referred to in a blog site on the internet dated January 30, 2011 at in an entry entitled “Story About Sexual Violence in West Papua [By] Army Personnel”, which refers to “an article titled An Anatomy of Separatists in Papua, [by] Maj. D. Arm Fence”.  The article was published by the Secretariat for Justice and Peace, Archdiocese Merauke, Papua. Some others of these documents have been quoted previously (see, although many appear to be new, or at least to have received no public analysis; hence this report.

[2] The author of the Anatomy document is named as Major Arm Fence D Marani.

[3] Private conversation with senior Indonesian officials accompanying President Yudhoyono on his visit to Australia, Sydney University, 8 March, 2010.

Statement on Indonesia Intelligence Bill Drafting

Advocacy Coalition on Indonesia Intelligence Bill Joint Statement

Indonesian parliament with the government plans to ratify the State Intelligence Bill draft to become the Law of Intelligence in 2011. Through a series of discussions that have been done by the parliament and government, Intelligence draft has undergone several changes.

From the beginning we give full support to the parliament and the government’s plan which will regulate intelligence institution through the establishment of the Intelligence Bill. However, discussion and ratification of the Intelligence Bill should become integral part of intelligence reform. In that context, the basic principles of democratic state should have been an inherent part of the Intelligence Bill.

We assessed that the draft of State Intelligence Bill that is being discussed parliament is not fully accommodate the principles of democratic countries and it raises serious issues against the values of democratic life of the country itself, including:

1. Intelligence definition
Article 1 point (2) states intelligence as a state government agency. Basically, the intelligence agencies are not government agencies but the instrument of the state. The definition has put intelligence position as tool of the ruler that works for the interests of rulers and not the instrument of the state which work for the benefit of its people. It’s very concerning since it is very likely intelligence can be used to spy on people in the interest of the ruler alone and not to the real enemy as Indonesia had experienced in the New Order era.

2. Intercept
The existence of refusal of court authorization requirement before conducting interception as mentioned in the explanation of Article 31 is not only potentially threaten citizens’ rights but also vulnerable to abuse (abuse of power) for the sake of economic and political power. Intelligence do need the authority to conduct tapping/interception, however, it must be done through a standardized and rigid mechanism and must have a clear prerequisite, such as the importance of getting court approval for conducting interception.

Referring to the decisions of the Constitutional Court No. 006/PPU-1/2003; No. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006; No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010, the Court believes it is necessary to establish specific regulation about interception on the level of State Law/Bill to prevent the possibility of abuse of authority for wiretapping and recording. Thus it is only appropriate that the discussion of the Intelligence bill conducted in parallel with the discussion of the bill on Interception in the interest of coordinating arrangements for intelligence ability to intercepts.

3. Secret Intelligence Information
Setting intelligence secret referred in Article 24 jo Article 39 of the Intelligence Bill draft still raises multiple interpretations and are vague. The multiple interpretations are threatening the freedom of information, freedom of the press and democracy itself.

4. Arrest (List of Revision given by Government)
Granting authority for the intelligence to arrest threatens human rights and damage criminal justice system mechanism. To grant the authority is tantamount to legalizing kidnapping using Intelligence Bill considering intelligence work is closed/covert and secret. It is important to remember that the state intelligence agency is part of the non-judicial agencies that are not included as part of law enforcement officers, such as police and prosecutors, therefore granting authority to arrest is wrong and can not be justified. In a country that respect rule of law, authority to arrest and detain is only obtained by law enforcement officials.

5. State Intelligence Coordinating Institution (Lembaga Koordinasi Intelijen Negara – LKIN)
State Intelligence Coordinating Institution (LKIN) as the new institution provided by this bill will be the agency that replaces the position of the State Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara – BIN) that has very broad authorityy. In that case, LKIN should not have the operational authority and functions, such as making communication interception, checking flow of funds, and such. Implementation of operational functions should be handed over to existing intelligence agencies which have operational authority.

6. Oversight
Oversight mechanism in the National Intelligence Bill draft is only made in the form of parliamentary oversight by the House of Representatives held by the completeness of the House of Representatives in charge of intelligence oversight. There are no regulations governing internal controls, executive oversight, and legal supervision. At this point, the oversight conducted by the parliament should be performed by a separate intelligence committees within the parliament, namely by forming a new special commission overseeing the intelligence.

7. Organization and Role
From an organizational standpoint, the Bill draft did not adopt the State Intelligence structural differentiation and specialization of functions. State Intelligence Bill draft does not strictly divide the working area of foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, military intelligence, and law enforcement intelligence.

8. Structure and Position
State Intelligence Bill draft also has not been able to separate accountability between the structures that is responsible for policy making with the structure responsible for operational in implementation of the policy. Ideally all security actors who serve as executors of the policy are under or become part of ministries/ministerial-level the structure, intelligence agencies are no exception.

9. Personnel and Recruitment
Associated with members of the intelligence, the State Intelligence Bill regulates vaguely of intelligence personnel. It is not regulated whether recruitment mechanism is either open or closed.

10. Code of Conduct and Prohibition
In addition, the State Intelligence Bill draft does not contain regulation or codes of ethic for intelligence that includes obligations, rights and restrictions for all activities and aspects of intelligence.

11. Making Intelligence a Civil Institution
This Bill draft has not incorporated the agenda of making intelligence as civil institution. Ideally in the era of democracy, all intelligence agencies are civilian and not active military, except for military intelligence. Until now, the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) is still filled by active military personnel despite the head of intelligence is civilian.

12. Rights of victims
State Intelligence Bill draft has not included the rights of victims, particularly those related to complaints of victims if there are intelligence actions that are deviate and caused serious problems for the implementation of the rights of people.

We urge the parliament and the Indonesian government not to rush in passing the State Intelligence Bill and provide space for the community to provide input and views on the efforts to improve the State Intelligence Bill draft, as provided in Law No. 10 Year 2004 on Procedures for Making Laws and Regulations.

We fully appreciate members of Parliament who rejected the plan on granting intelligence the authority to arrest in the Intelligence Bill. Ideally the formulation of the Intelligence Bill is to maintain a balance between the need for countries to guarantee and protect the freedom of civil society and human rights on one hand; and to guard and protect national security on the other.

Jakarta, March 28, 2011
Advocacy Coalition on Indonesia Intelligence Bill

Imparsial, Kontras, IDSPS, Elsam, the Ridep Institute, Lesperssi, Setara Institute, LBH Masyarakat, ICW, YLBHI, LBH Jakarta, HRWG, Praxis, Infid, Yayasan SET, KRHN, Leip, Ikohi, Foker Papua, PSHK, MAPI, dan Media Link

Bambang Widodo Umar

We hope international network can help monitor and push Indonesian government to create Intelligence Bill that is accountable and respect the value of democracy.

We welcome every feedback and support from your organization around the world.

Have a nice day,


Mufti Makaarim al-Ahlaq
Executive Director
Institute for Defense Security and Peace Studies

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