Tag: dialogue

NZ Aid fosters impunity, status quo by Indonesian security forces

http://indonesiahumanrights.org.nz/west-papua/west-papua/

New Zealand International Review
September/October 2010 Vol 35,No 5

Maire Leadbeater criticises New Zealand’s approach to the provision of aid to Indonesia, and calls for respect for the wishes of the West Papuan people

New Zealand’s diplomacy with respect to Indonesian-controlled West Papua, especially in light of its aid to the Indonesian military and to the police in West Papua, has worrying aspects. The Indonesian military is not yet accountable to the civilian authority, and both the police and the military in West Papua have a grievous record of human rights violations. Although the New Zealand government view is that we are supporting reform of these institutions, New Zealand’s aid instead supports the status quo and ongoing repression. A more constructive role for New Zealand would be that of a facilitator in a peaceful dialogue between Jakarta and West Papuan representatives.

Maire Leadbeater is the spokesperson for the Indonesia Human Rights Committee (Auckland)

New Zealand is a trusted friend and supporter of Indonesia. There is much benefit to be gained from people-to-people ties, cultural and educational links and from most trade ties. But there are strong reasons to oppose the aid that is given to the most repressive forces in Indonesian society – the police and the military.

In explanation, first some historical context and then a more detailed case example looking at West Papua, the Indonesian-controlled western half of the island of New Guinea. This analysis draws on Ministry of Foreign Affairs documentation, some of it heavily censored, obtained under the Official Information Act.

During the time of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in Indonesia, the General knew he could count on us. ‘Good relations’ were established around the time of Suharto’s ascension in 1966 – a period marred by the bloody purge of up to half a million dissidents’ and ‘communists’, one of last centuries largest massacres. New Zealand backed the highly contested annexations of both West Papua in 1969 and East Timor in 1975.

I have extensively documented this history in the case of East Timor, showing how New Zealand supported Indonesia in the United Nations and in other forums. New Zealand also helped the Indonesian military with officer training, from 1973 on. Defence ties were only suspended after the worst of the 1999 post-referendum violence in East Timor, and quietly resumed again in 2007.

Indonesia is now twelve years on from the dark days of the Suharto dictatorship, and in some ways the democratic gains are remarkable. But there are worrying hangovers – books and films are still banned, especially if they deal with black chapters in Indonesia’s history, such as the invasion of East Timor. Corruption is still endemic and has a grave impact on every of level of the administration, including the justice system.

The biggest roadblock to further democratic reform is the entrenched power of the military, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). The military has never faced up to its role in supporting Suharto’s tyranny and its officers remain unaccountable for their crimes against humanity. Credible charges of horrendous East Timor crimes have proved no barrier to advancement, as in the case of Syafrie Syamsuddin, who was recently appointed a Deputy Minister of Defence. He is an East Timor Kopassus veteran alleged to have been the key commander of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, and one of the masterminds of the bloody campaign of vengeance wreaked on the Timorese when they voted for independence.

Despite 2004 legislation which required the TNI to quit its business network, the military still draws on off-budget funding from innumerable legal and illegal business interests.

Most of the time New Zealand’s relations with Indonesia do not get onto the public radar. But in the 1990s as news began to spread about atrocities in East Timor, the Foreign Affairs Ministry had to perfect a public relations strategy to account for the pro-Indonesia policy position.

Key components
Key components of this strategy are the promotion of ‘quiet diplomacy’ and ‘constructive engagement’ usually through aid. In bilateral meetings behind closed doors New Zealand Ministers raise human rights concerns with their Indonesian counterparts. These exchanges can be pointed, but frequently they are amount to little more than ritual expressions that require minimal response from the Indonesian side. At its worst this ‘quiet diplomacy’ is a blatant exercise in collusion Just before Indonesia invaded East Timor, our diplomats told their Indonesian counterparts that the Government had a ‘private and public position on the problem’. The ‘private position’ was support for integration while the ‘public’ position was to respect the wishes of the Timorese people.

The dramatic end of Indonesian rule over East Timor shook the foundations of our Government’s pro-Indonesia policies. New Zealand police and peacekeeping forces played their part in restoring order and in confronting the rump end of the Indonesian-trained militia forces. In 2000 New Zealander Private Leonard Manning paid the price with his life. But the crisis did not have a long term impact on the bilateral relationship – the ‘East Timor case’ was successfully ring-fenced. The parallels between the situation of East Timor and West Papua were not explored.

Yet, the situation in West Papua today has some strong similarities with pre-liberation East Timor. West Papuans still struggle for the freedom they were promised by the Dutch colonial power, and were deprived of after a United States brokered agreement allowed Indonesian troops to occupy West Papua. The United Nations agreed to allow Indonesia to conduct a so-called ‘Act of Free Choice’ in 1969, a voting process that only 1,022 out of nearly a million Papuans took part in, which is widely known today as ‘The Act of No Choice’. Effectively there is a state of de facto occupation by the Indonesian armed forces and the Special Forces Kopassus, which has personnel stationed in nearly every district. Access for foreign journalists and the human rights investigators and humanitarian agencies is severely restricted and at times even New Zealand Embassy diplomats have had their requests to visit put on hold.

Drastic decline
West Papua is richer in terms of resources than any other part of the Indonesian archipelago, but poorer on every index of human well-being – health, income levels, and education. Human rights groups, including the Indonesian Human Rights Commission (Komnas Ham) state that the human rights situation in West Papua experienced a ‘drastic decline’ in 2009. The police treat as criminals and ‘separatists’ those who try to take part in legal peaceful demonstrations. Late in 2009 a police team captured and killed a key Free Papua Movement leader, Kelly Kwalik, despite the fact that he had earlier met willingly with Indonesian police.

In the 47 years since Indonesia assumed control, West Papua, (named Irian Jaya by Indonesia until 2000) is believed to have lost at least 100,000 of its people to the ongoing conflict. Resistance to Indonesian rule has changed over time from a low level guerrilla struggle in the mountains to a wider campaign of non-violent resistance.

New Zealand diplomats make regular visits to West Papua and their reports indicate that they have a clear-eyed awareness of the level of unrest and suffering. The Embassy officials, whether representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or NZAID, are no doubt sincere in wanting to make a positive difference, but are partisan in a situation of strong internal conflict. New Zealand consistently supports Indonesia’s right to preserve its ‘territorial integrity’ and by implication its antagonism to ‘separatism.’

In the past decade this has meant that New Zealand has supported Jakarta’s 2001 Special Autonomy legislation for Papua, even though Papuans were never consulted about it. Official statements consistently express the view that the ‘best route to a peaceful solution in Papua’ is the full implementation of the Special Autonomy package.

One report has some essentially patronising advice for Papuans who hoped for greater freedom (‘merdeka’ in Indonesian):

Papuan leaders should be encouraged to make the most of the opportunities given to them by special autonomy. No matter how understandable their desire for merdeka, it is a dangerous distraction. Health and education needs are urgent. The money is already there. It is up to the Papuans to use it wisely.

Softening process
There is considerable evidence that New Zealand’s aid projects have been used to help soften the edges of questionable foreign policy practice. At the time of the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor, New Zealand made much of a package of aid sent through the Red Cross to both East and West Timor. In 1978 when even the Red Cross was excluded from East Timor, news of a devastating famine leaked to the outside world. When Indonesia’s Foreign Minister visited that year New Zealand successfully negotiated to send food aid and the New Zealand Herald headlined the story ‘Aid acceptable if Indonesia can call the tune.’

A key component of New Zealand’s current aid to Indonesia, the largest bilateral aid package in the Asian region, is presented as peace building and human rights training. To what extent does this aid provide our Government with a handy rejoinder to challenges that it is soft on human rights in Indonesia? And is this aid supporting genuine reform and change or is it being carefully directed in ways that will not challenge the established order and vested interests? In 2006 the New Zealand Government pursued the resumption of defence ties with Indonesia and the commencement of a programme to offer training in community policing to the Papuan police force.

Dramatic Year
2006 was a dramatic year for West Papua. It opened in January with the much publicised arrival of 43 Papuan asylum seekers at Cape Horn, Australia. They had barely survived their journey by traditional wooden boat and all put forward claims of abuse and persecution which were eventually accepted.

In March a student demonstration against the presence of the Freeport McMoran mine escalated into a violent confrontation between demonstrators and the police. Four officers of the Police Force and a member of the Indonesia air force died. In the aftermath 23 were arrested, and hundreds fled across the border as the Brimob paramilitary police raided dormitories and fired on students they believed to have been involved. Human rights groups and the churches reported that the detainees had been beaten and tortured and later alleged that the trials were deeply flawed. At the end of the year there were reports of military sweeping operations in the Highlands area.
Early in 2007 thirty two West Papuan police (only 10 of them indigenous Papuans) attended a workshop in Jayapura at which participants were told how New Zealand police try to build community relations and anticipate and prevent conflict.

The Ministry memos record how the Police Area Commander in Jayapura asked for New Zealand assistance with community policing and said he had instructions from the National Police Chief to ‘get back the confidence of the community’ following the March riots. During the same meeting the Police Chief, General Tommy Yacobus also told the Second Secretary that one of his priorities for 2007 was to increase the percentage of indigenous Papuans within POLDA Papua which was currently at 4%.

When the programme was being rolled out in 2008, I wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Winston Peters, and to the Minister of Police, Annette King. Both sent replies suggesting that the programme would improve police adherence to international human rights standards and help the Papuan police to improve the way they work with local communities. Peters suggested that he did not favour isolating Indonesia.

Basic Tenet
The right to free expression is a basic tenet of international human rights yet there are some 45 political prisoners in Papua, including many arrested for daring to raise a banned Morning Star nationalist flag. Police even interrogate women in the market-place for selling handicrafts decorated with a nationalist symbol.

It will take more than workshops about community policing to win the hearts and minds of a people scarred by decades of police and military abuses and the killing of revered leaders. And as for the Police Chief’s hope of recruiting indigenous Papuans to the almost entirely migrant force, Papuans describe a rigorous selection process for new recruits: An interrogation process ensures that anyone joining up must deny or hide any connection however remote to those who support independence.

New Zealand’s military training for Indonesia largely consists of bilateral officer exchanges: each year an Indonesian officer attends the New Zealand Defence Force’s Command and Staff College to participate in the senior staff course while NZDF officers attend courses in Indonesia. Our Government defends this programme on the grounds that engagement with the Indonesian military will promote positive reform.

Will Indonesian practice improve by osmosis if we continue to work alongside their officers? The advocates of engagement would say New Zealand continues to criticise human rights abuses, but which is the stronger message – our polite, mainly private exchanges about human rights or our increasing co-operation with the forces of repression?

Good example
The following episode is a good example of how engagement opens a door for Indonesia to co-opt New Zealand to support its local agenda. In September 2008, New Zealand Embassy representatives, (deputy head of mission and second secretary) visited West Papua to discuss matters such as New Zealand’s support for the full implementation of Papua Special Autonomy Law and the New Zealand Community Policing Initiative, which had ‘emerged as the centerpiece of New Zealand’s engagement in Papua and West Papua.’

The Embassy reported on their first visit in two years as a success:
In the past Embassy visits to the two provinces have been confined to information gathering. This time it was very different – we had something concrete to offer. That was reflected in the warm reception accorded to us. The NZAID-funded, NZ Police Community Policing (CP) project is now the centerpiece of New Zealand’s constructive engagement approach with Indonesia on the Papua issue. It demonstrates New Zealand is serious in its desire to make a real difference on the ground in the two provinces.

However, one meeting during this visit seems to have been more challenging as the sub-heading for the meeting at TNI Kodam XV11 headquarters indicates: ‘An encounter with TNI: Some old bugbears’. Chief of Staff Brigadier General Hambali, who was accompanied by the Head of Intelligence, appears to have put the diplomats to the test:

In outlining New Zealand’s policy we said we did not speak with a forked tongue – what we were saying to him we had said to others we had met during our visit. Our comment that the New Zealand Government did not support separatism elicited an animated response from Hambali, who said he was pleased to hear that.

This meeting was written up in the Papua Pos newspaper and also on the military website. These accounts suggest that the Embassy team had been critical of media and non-governmental organisations for exploiting ‘the negative side of developments in Papua and West Papua’. This is unlikely to be a simple ‘lost in translation’ situation as the comments in the report indicate:

Attached are clippings and English language translations of articles that appeared in the Papua Pos and on the TNI website. Large chunks of the articles, including purported criticism by the DHOM of NGOs and the media were a complete fabrication, as was our alleged commendation of TNI.

Aid issues
I also fear that the emphasis on programmes supporting the police or military, may edge out expenditure on humanitarian aid. Recent New Zealand Government statements promote using aid to help other countries achieve ‘sustainable economic growth’, but most indigenous West Papuans cannot join the economic mainstream without improvements in basic health and education levels. NZAID currently grants eleven Indonesians scholarships for post-graduate study at a New Zealand University each year. However, only two indigenous Papuans have been granted a post-graduate scholarship since 2007.

New Zealand does support the UNDP People Centred Development Programme, a complex co-ordination project involving non-governmental organisations and other international donors aimed at improving living standards. To some extent Papuans are cautious about engaging with at this level of official aid which is always carried out with close involvement of the Indonesian authorities. A strong case can be made for an alternative aid approach based on working with small local projects led by local non-governmental organisations or churches.

In June 2010, the Papuan People’s Assembly or MRP, a kind of ‘upper house’ in the governance structure with limited powers, held a consultation which resolved to reject the Special Autonomy Law and symbolically hand it back to the regional Parliament. The community responded with support demonstrations of up to 20,000 people calling for a referendum on independence and genuine dialogue with Jakarta. The security forces were unusually restrained in the face of the unprecedented size of the mobilisations.

In parallel with these developments, West Papua’s Melanesian neighbour, the Republic of Vanuatu, resolved on a new foreign policy direction which explicitly mandates Vanuatu to take a number of initiatives in support of West Papua’s independence. Vanuatu will sponsor a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly calling for the International Court of Justice to arbitrate on the legality of the 1969 ‘Act of Free Choice.’

Tipping point
Will these events form the tipping point to prod Jakarta into listening to West Papuan voices? It is nearly two years since the respected Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) published the Papua Road Map which addressed the marginalisation of the indigenous West Papuan people and proposed a dialogue along similar lines to that which helped to bring peace to Aceh in 2005.

The concept of a dialogue has been given a cautious welcome by the Governor of Papua, but as yet there is no clear indication how this dialogue might be facilitated and mediated, and some resistance groups sound a note of caution that any dialogue must have genuine independent facilitation preferably from the United Nations.

Over the years many Papuan leaders have raised the possibility that New Zealand could help to facilitate a peace dialogue for West Papua – drawing on the successful process mediated by New Zealand which helped to resolve the crisis in Bougainville. To the best of my knowledge there is no current New Zealand offer on the table. Eight years ago a guarded offer of mediation was briefly floated but the Foreign Affairs Minister at the time, Phil Goff, stressed that the decision rested with Indonesia and did not pursue the suggestion.

There is still time for New Zealand to make a new beginning and put the aspirations of the Papuan people first before the need to please Indonesia. This is the moment when the Papuan people urgently need international advocates to support their call for a genuine dialogue that can address all the problems in West Papua including the ‘forbidden’ topics of political status and West Papua’s troubled history.

NOTES

NZ Dept of External Affairs Annual Report for the year ended 31 March, 1967: ‘Since the new Indonesian Government has embarked on a more constructive international policy…the New Zealand Government has been able to look forward to increased contacts and rewarding relationship with the Republic.’
Maire F Leadbeater,. ‘Negligent Neighbour: New Zealand’s Complicity in the Invasion and Occupation of Timor-Leste’, (Nelson, 2006)
Syafrie Syamsuddin is named as having ‘command responsibility’ in UN- funded human rights reports including the 2001 Report of James Dunn and the 2005 Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
Komnas Ham and Kontras, Papua Joint Presentation on Human Rights, 17 Jan, 2010
The territory was named Papua in 2000, but is still generally known internationally as West Papua, especially in the solidarity movement. In 2003 the territory was controversially subdivided into two provinces named Papua and West Papua.
Phil Goff, to Maire Leadbeater for the Indonesia Human Rights Committee, 1 Dec 2003
, NZ Embassy Jakarta to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington: 16 Dec 2002, memo ‘Indonesia:Visit to Papua: Separatism and Independence’ ,
Ibid., 10 April, 2007, cable ‘Indonesia:Papua: Community Policing Workshop – A Partnership Approach’
, Ibid., 9 Jan memo: ‘Indonesia: Papua: Community Policing’
Winston Peters to Indonesia Human Rights Committee, 9 June, 2008
NZ Embassy Jakarta to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 23 Sep 2008 ‘Indonesia: Visit to Papua and West Papua-Overview’,
Papua Pos , 11 Sep 2008 and TNI website article, 15 Sep 2008: translations provided in ibid.
NZAID Website downloaded 14 May, 2010
. Examples of this is are: the ‘Mama Mamas’ project supported by Pax Christi empowering and strengthening the women who run market-place craft enterprises in Jayapura and the Oxfam New Zealand livelihood project in Nabire.

West Papua Report September 2010

West Papua Report
September 2010
This is the 77th in a series of monthly reports that focus on developments affecting Papuans. This series is produced by the non-profit West Papua Advocacy Team (WPAT) drawing on media accounts, other NGO assessments, and analysis and reporting from sources within West Papua. This report is co-published with the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) Back issues are posted online at http://etan.org/issues/wpapua/default.htm Questions regarding this report can be addressed to Edmund McWilliams at edmcw@msn.com.

Summary:

More than a score of international non-governmental organizations called on President Yudhoyono to release Papuan Political Prisoners in commemoration of Indonesia’s August 17 Independence Day. Although the President did release and reduce sentences for convicted terrorists and common criminals on the national day, he did not respond to the appeal regarding political prisoners. The Indonesian Government has banned activities by Cordaid, a Dutch humanitarian organization that has aided poor Papuans for over three decades. The action is reminiscent of the Indonesian Government’s banning of International Committee of The Red Cross in West Papua in 2009. The Indonesian Commission on Human Rights and Papuan churches have urged the Indonesian government to reconsider its security approach in the Puncak Jaya region and address the growing violence there, including attacks on churches. The Indonesian government is under growing pressure to investigate the mysterious murder of a journalist in Merauke. Local police claim he committed suicide. The murdered journalist had built a reputation on investigation of illegal military businesses. The murder comes at a time of growing tension in the area as corporate interests seek to develop a massive food plantation. A video circulating widely on YouTube reveals the final moments of a Papuan bayoneted while in custody as he is taunted by the police.

Contents:

* International NGOs Call on President Yudhoyono to Release Papuan Political Prisoners

* The Indonesian Government Blocks the Operations of International Humanitarian Aid Group in West Papua

* Komnas HAM Speaks out Against Security Forces Operations in Puncak Jaya

* Churches Call for an Investigation of Attacks on Churches in Puncak Jaya

* Government under Growing Pressure to Seriously Investigate Journalist’s Murder

* The Reality of Security Force Brutality in West Papua

International NGOs Call on President Yudhoyono to Release Papuan Political Prisoners

Twenty five international non-governmental organizations have urged President Yudhoyono to release Papuan Political Prisoners. The August 16 letter which on the President to announce the release in the context of August 17 Independence Day celebrations. The letter also urged him to amend the Indonesian Criminal Code which criminalizes peaceful political protest and to investigate and prosecute prison warders guilty of abuse of these prisoners.

The NGO appeal noted that Indonesia’s incarceration of peaceful political dissenters violates Indonesia’s commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which Indonesia ratified in 2006. Indonesian authorities also have incarcerated Moluccans and others engaged in peaceful protest. There continue to be credible reports that political prisoners are being mistreated in custody.

President Yudhoyono has failed to respond to the NGO appeal though he did announce release of criminal prisoners, including those convicted of crimes of violence.

(See here to view full text of the August 16 letter and list of 25 signatories)

The Indonesian Government Blocks Operations of International Humanitarian Group in West Papua

The Jakarta Post, August 6, reported that the Indonesian government has banned Cordaid, a Dutch funding agency, from operating in West Papua. Cordaid has operated in West Papua for over three decades, assisting Papuan NGOs and the Papuan people more generally with a focus on social development and economic empowerment for the poor.

The ban came in the form of a refusal by the Ministry of Social Affairs to extend an existing Memorandum of Understanding that had expired in April of this year. The Government announcement that Cordaid must end its activities came in the form of a July 23 letter from the Social Affairs Ministry that responding to the standard request for an extension.

In rejecting the extension the Ministry, according to the Post, voiced suspicions regarding Cordaid’s exchange program between Papua and Mindanao, a restive region in southern Philippines –the program promoted participation of women in development from a faith-based and women’s perspective. The Government suspicions included purported Cordaid support for separatist elements.

In her written response to the Ministry, Cordaid sector manager Margriet Nieuwenhuis strongly denied that Cordaid helped Papua separatists. “The participants met only with Mindanao community groups and women leaders, not with political actors,” Nieuwenhuis said, adding that the program had been stopped.

The Jakarta Post reported that the July 23 letter also alleged that Cordaid had violated a “principle provision” in the memorandum of agreement with the Indonesian government. The letter claimed that “Cordaid has been involved in commercial and political activities by being a shareholder of Bank Andara and sponsoring the participation of a community group in the “Initiatives for International Dialog (IID).” The Indonesian ministry contended that IID supported secessionist movements in southern Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines and Indonesia.” The government requested that Cordaid hand over ongoing projects to its local partners and neither expand the scope of the projects nor extend deadlines.

While adhering to the ban, Cordaid said its share in Bank Andara was less than 10 percent and that its participation in the program was directed toward support of microfinance institutions, particularly those with a strong focus on poverty reduction, helping clients who are considered too poor by other financial institutions to get loans.

The government’s policy to ban Cordaid was criticized by prominent human rights lawyer Totdung Mulya Lubis who said the decision was taken “too hastily” and without sufficient evidence. “It could set a bad precedent and lead outsiders to believe Indonesia is isolating Papua,” he said. Lubis pointed out that the government needed foreign donors to help develop Papua, one of Indonesia’s poorest regions. The Post quoted Lubis as observing that “to stop foreign social funding is akin to killing off NGOs in Papua, which almost entirely depend on overseas funding.

WPAT Comment: The decision to close the Cordaid office in West Papua parallels the decision to close down operations there by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2009. Cordaid, like the ICRC, is seeking to negotiate its return to West Papua quietly. Shutting down the operation of these respected humanitarian organizations is consistent with the Jakarta policy to limit international assistance to Papuans who for decades have suffered from a dearth of basic humanitarian services and respect for human rights, areas of need that Cordaid and the ICRC respectively were manifestly addressing. The decision also is consistent with Jakarta’s long standing campaign to limit international awareness of Papuan suffering. Finally, it is noteworthy that closing the operation of these two organizations which have done so much good for Papuans was a decision taken exclusively by Jakarta with no involvement of Papuans. These two episodes underscore that the promise of “special autonomy” is hollow.

Komnas HAM Speaks out against Security Forces Operations in Puncak Jaya

The Papuan branch of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) urged the Indonesian police and military to cease their military operations in Puncak Jaya district, in an August 11 statement by Mathius Murib, deputy chair of the organization in Jayapura. The public appeal came on the heels of a visit to the area by a Komnas HAM team to investigate recent incidents. The team, which Murib led, urged senior police officials in Puncak Jaya to initiate legal proceedings against all those persons or groups involved in the Puncak Jaya case from 2004 rather than simply employ armed force.

Murib noted that from 17 August 2004 up to August 2010 the inhabitants of Puncak Jaya have lived in a constant state of trauma because of reports that dozens of civilians as well as members of the security forces have been killed in Puncak Jaya. Murib urged that the police and the military immediately stop all operations to hunt people down in Puncak Jaya district and consider instead other ways of resolving the problems there. “We believe that force of arms or other forms of violence will never resolve these problems and will only lead to yet more problems and more casualties,” he said.

He also urged the civilian population in the area to remain calm, work together, and avoid being provoked by irresponsible elements. Murib said that Komnas HAM will be urging the district chief of Puncak Jaya as well as civil society, in particular the church, to draft a comprehensive account of developments during the current year. Murib explained that the role of the church in particular was important.

Churches Call for an Investigation of Attacks on Churches in Puncak Jayaa

Church leaders in the Puncak Jaya region on August 18 called for an investigation of shootings which have targeted churches in Puncak Jaya since 2004. Rev. Socrates Yoman, President of the Fellowship of Baptist Churches in Papua, called for creation of an “independent team” to investigate the attacks.

The Jakarta Post reported that Yoman’s call has been echoed by other Papuan religious leaders including the Indonesia Christian Churches (GKI) of Papua, Indonesia Bible Churches, the Kingmi Synod of Papua, the Catholic Diocese of Jayapura. All specifically call for an independent investigation of the attacks.

For its part, the Fellowship of Baptist Churches of Papua urged the provincial council and the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP) to immediately invite the Governor and police and military chiefs to explain about the violence to the public and appealed to people to remain calm.

Government under Growing Pressure to Investigate Journalist’s Murder Seriously

The July 30 murder of journalist Ardiansyah Matra’is in Merauke and the failure of the Indonesian police to seriously investigate the crime has drawn growing criticism.

A police autopsy of the victim revealed that Matra’is was struck by several blows before falling into the water and drowning in Maro River, Merauke. The Indonesian police spokesman in Jakarta acknowledged that several of Matra’is teeth were missing and that there was swelling in several parts of his body, wounds likely to have resulted from his having been struck with a blunt implement. The Merauke police, however, rejected the announcement in Jakarta, saying that Matra’is had probably committed suicide.

Nezar Patria, the chairman of the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) stated that the police should immediately investigate who murdered Matra’is, adding that it had sent a representative to visit Jayapura and trying to arrange a meeting in Jakarta with the national police.

Forkorus Yoboisembut, the chairman of the Papuan Customary Council, suggested President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to set up an independent team to investigate the murder of Matra’is as well as Ridwan Salamun, a Sun TV stringer in Tual, Kei Island, on August 21.

Yoboisembut told the Voice of Human Rights radio that many parties have interest in not having the police to seriously investigate the Matra’is murder. “I think if the case is investigated, many parties will be implicated, prompting the investigation to be delayed up to now, a month after the murder.”

Matra’is is the son of a Javanese transmigrant in Merauke. He worked mostly as a freelancer, including his latest work for the Tabloid Jubi website. He is survived by his wife and two children.

The Voice of Human Rights reported that Matra’is had earlier written reports on illegal logging around Jayapura as well as military businesses in Merauke. The killing transpired at a time of growing tension in the Merauke area associated with a plan backed by the local government and Jakarta to create a massive plantation. The “development” plan would severely impact local Papuans who rely on the forest and other lands that would be consumed by the project. Local opposition and local media coverage of that protest has been under growing pressure from local authorities. Some journalists received threatening text messages in the week during which Matra’is was murdered.

Complicating any effort to understand or resolve this crime is the infiltration of intelligence personnel into the ranks of journalists. The Voice of Human Rights named two men who had allegedly worked for the intelligence and infiltrated the Tabloid Jubi website. One of them is a Javanese man who originates from Rangkas Bitung, West Java, but went to college in Yogjakarta, who claimed that he is an NGO activist but also a car workshop owner, a crocodile skin trader and a political analyst. His writing revealed his Indonesian military-styled analysis about the failures of local elites in post-Helsinki Aceh and in Sarmi, Papua. He has disappeared from Papua after the Matra’is murder.

see also

* FORUM-ASIA, Imparsial, and AJI Condemn the Murders of Two Journalists in Indonesia
* IFJ Worried for Safety of Journalists in Papua As Elections Loom
* CPJ: Indonesian reporter dies; had received death threats

The Reality of Security Force Brutality in West Papua

Through much of August a video depicting the reality of Indonesian state security force brutality in West Papua has circulated widely on the internet. The stark YouTube video presents the last minutes of a Papuan man captured and then bayoneted by the Indonesian police (Brimob). In the video, as the man lies dying with his intestines spilling onto the ground, his head propped against a log, he is taunted and tormented by his murderers. “Oh God!” Yawan Wayeni cries a few times in pain. Instead of treating him, the policemen seen on the video continue to question and taunt him. The scene is reminiscent of the killing of Papuan resistance leader Kelly Kwalik several months later who bled to death from an untreated bullet wound to his thigh while in police custody.

see Al-Jazeera report on video – http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wxHTpQho5es&feature=channell

The torture-murder of Yawan transpired in early August 2009 but the video of his final moments surfaced only in late July 2010. During the intervening 11 months the police failed to investigate the incident. Only in the wake of the surfacing of the tape and growing international outrage did the police move to investigate. But even that tardy explanation has been inappropriate with police threats and intimidation aimed at any potential witnesses including Yawan’s wife and young family. The evidence the police have sought to suppress incriminates Yawan’s captors: Yawan was seized without a weapon and was hobbled by a bullet wound to the calf. He was secure in police custody at the time a bayonet was thrust into his abdomen.

Yawan was no stranger to the Indonesian authorities and was on a police blacklist. He was the personal bodyguard of the Chairperson of the Serui Traditional Board, Yusuf Tanawani, a vocal critic of Indonesian policy. Yawan, 39, was also a member of the “Team of 100” Papuan civil society leaders who in 1999 met with President B.J. Habibie at the Palace to demand independence for Papua. It was this group that 50 U.S. members of Congress proposed that President Obama meet with during his anticipated November 2010 visit to Indonesia.

At the time of his capture, as he breakfasted at dawn with his family in a potato patch on Yaopen Waropen islands, Yawan was also a wanted man. He had who escaped from Serui prison months earlier where was serving a nine-year jail sentence for state-alleged involvement in an armed raid against the employees of PT Artha Makmur Permai and the military post at Saubeba, Serui. According to the report of the Commission for Missing Persons & Victims of Violence (Kontras), during the raid the police found only Yawan’s wife and children in the hut. Yawan’s widow has stated that Yawan did not have a weapon. He had fled the breakfast site at their approach but returned when his children began crying in the presence of the heavily armed police at their garden hut. As he returned to the site of his distressed family he was shot in the calf and seized.

Chairman of the National Commission for Human Rights, Ifdhal Kasim has joined in a wide public outcry in Indonesia over the incident, insisting the “Police must investigate Yawan’s death and protect his family.”

Indonesia and the challenge of Papuan separatism

copyright rests with original author

Piece originally appears at http://www.idsa.in/node/5803/1097

Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis [India]
August 25, 2010

IDSA COMMENT

Indonesia and the challenge of Papuan separatism

Bilveer Singh

Introduction

If there are any symbols of Papuans’ continued quest and determination
for sovereign independence1, it is their continued attachment to their
flag, the Morning Star or Bintang Kejora (in Indonesian), their
Anthem, Hai Tanahku Papua (in Indonesian) or Oh, My Land Papua,
written by a Dutch missionary in the 1930s and the continued existence
of the OPM, Papua Independence Movement since 1964. The Morning Star
was first formally unveiled on 1 December 1961, symbolising the onset
of the Republic of West Papua and flew till October 1962, when the
former Dutch colony was transferred to the United Nations Temporary
Executive Authority through a deal brokered by the United States,
mainly to prevent Indonesia from joining the Soviet Camp during the
Cold War. Indonesia took control of the territory in the following
year and formally incorporated West Papua, renamed West Irian, into
Indonesia in 1969, recognised by the United Nations. However, Papuans
have continued to challenge the territory’s integration into Indonesia
and a bloody struggle has ensued ever since, with supporters of Papuan
independence claiming that more than 100,000 Papuans have been killed
by the Indonesian military. The violence has continued right to the
present period and it remains illegal to fly the Bintang Kejora in
Indonesia and many Papuans continue to be incarcerated for doing so.
Anatomy of Papua

Located on the easternmost part of Indonesia, geographically it
constitutes one-fifth of the country but only has a population of 3
million (of which the natives constitute only 50 per cent). Indonesia,
where 90 per cent of the people are Muslim, has a population of nearly
240 million. Papua is a largely Christian territory, where the
Protestants constitute the majority, followed by the Catholics and
then Muslims. However, tribalism is extremely dominant with more than
265 tribes representing the Putra Daerah or Sons of the Soil
(natives). Yet, the territory is extremely rich in natural resources,
especially oil, gas, gold and copper. It is also geo-strategically
important, bordering on land with Papua New Guinea and fronting the
Pacific Ocean.
Explaining Papuans’ Desire for Independence

Even though Indonesia declared independence in August 1945 and had to
fight the Dutch to gain complete sovereignty in December 1949, the
Dutch only surrendered Papua in October 1962. This represents an
important historical anomaly as Papua remained for another 12 years as
a Dutch colony compared to the rest of Indonesia. This provided the
Dutch ample time to develop a local Papuan elite that was committed to
independence and hence the importance of the Morning Star, National
Anthem, not to mention a rudimentary Parliament that was formed in
Jayapura in 1961. However, due to the Cold War, President Kennedy
succeeded in pressurising the Dutch to surrender the territory in 1962
and Indonesia, with the support of the West, legitimately gained
control of the territory by 1969. However, this was largely undertaken
against the wishes of the Papuan elites and hence the continued
struggle for Merdeka or independence ever since.

> From the perspective of Papuans, there are a number of grievances that
have provided a catalyst and triggered their demands for independence.
First, the sense of historical injustice when Papua was handed over to
Indonesia by the Dutch in 1962 without consulting Papuan elites and
later, the fraudulent manner in which the referendum, called Act of
Free Choice (but what the Papuans call Act of No Choice) was held in
1969. Thus, for the Papuans, Indonesia is an illegal colonizer and the
territory’s status should be reviewed through a referendum. Second,
gross unhappiness in the manner Jakarta has flooded the territory with
non-Papuans, mostly Muslims, thereby creating what Papuans refer to as
‘demographic and cultural genocide’ and where they are fast becoming
minorities in their own land. This has also intensified
social-cultural conflicts between the natives (Putra Daerah) and the
transmigrants (Pendatangs), the latter usually backed by officialdom.
Third, demographically, Papuans feel discriminated against, with the
majority Malay Indonesians looking down on the Melanesian Papuans (for
their dress code, eating and drinking habits, etc) and worst still,
most privileges being given to the former at the expense of the
latter.

Fourth, there is the rising impoverisation of the Papuans. Despite the
immense wealth of the territory, Papuans are among the poorest in
Indonesia. Instead, the wealth is sucked out to benefit non-Papuans
and foreigners, who in alliance with Jakarta, continue to benefit from
Jakarta’s rule over the territory. The operation of Freeport McMoran,
the world’s largest gold mine operator, is a case in point. Fifth,
Papuans are also in rage as the territory’s environment has been
pillaged and more important, the forest, which for the Papuans is not
only a community property but also important religiously, being
plundered. Finally, most blatant of all, has been the immense human
rights violations undertaken continuously by almost every government
in power in Jakarta since the days of Sukarno. Papuans have continued
to suffer as Indonesia has continued to treat the territory as a
colony and where any form of opposition, peaceful or otherwise, is
dealt with brutally. Indonesians refer to this as the ‘security
approach’ to development and Indonesia’s democratization in 1998 has
not really altered much as far as Papua is concerned. Many Papuan
leaders have been murdered by the Indonesian military, such as Theys
Eluay in November 2001. The continued existence, despite weaknesses,
of the Papua Independence Movement, is a testimony of Papuans’
willingness to take to arms to achieve their goal of independence. In
short, injustice, intolerance, exploitation and violence are the main
drivers that have motivated Papuans to seek an alternative future for
themselves.
Why is Indonesia Unwilling to give in to Papuan Separatists?

Papua is not only strategically vital, being a land, air and maritime
border zone, but probably more important is the immense wealth it
possesses. Jakarta depends on Papua for the bulk of its revenue and
Papua is probably Indonesia’s most important ‘golden goose’. It would
be a strategic and economic disaster if the territory were to be lost.
Also, Indonesians view Papua as an integral part of the Unitary State
of the Republic of Indonesia and any leader even contemplating giving
independence to Papua would be viewed as a national traitor, a price
President Habibie paid for East Timor’s independence. At the same
time, despite Papuans’ unhappiness, the bulk of the international
community continues to support Indonesia’s ownership of Papua given
that Indonesia is much more important than Papua. Jakarta leaders have
also argued that to give in to Papuans’ demand for independence would
open the Pandora’s Box leading others to demand likewise, resulting in
the break-up of Indonesia. In the final analysis, it is the simple
issue of political, economic and military asymmetry, and where the
Papuans are simply not in a position to challenge and dislodge
Indonesia. As such, while Indonesia is unprepared to abandon the
territory and most Papuans are unhappy to remain in Indonesia, the
impasse cannot be broken due to the paralysis both parties find
themselves in.
Indonesia’s Peace Overtures

Following the collapse of Suharto’s New Order and the onset of
democratic Indonesia, Jakarta has made peace with other separatists,
be it in East Timor (through a referendum leading to independence) or
with Aceh (leading to greater autonomy and local rule). In the same
vein, Jakarta has peddled what is referred to as Autonomi Khusus or
Special Autonomy in 2001, to meet half way Papuan grievances and
demands, and rejected a referendum a la East Timor as was demanded by
Papuan activists, fearing a break up Indonesia. While Papuans have
gained much in terms of Special Autonomy funds (5 trillion Indonesia
Rupiahs to date), the territory remains backward as the bulk of the
money is used for administration and pilfered through corruption. At
the same time, despite agreeing to a Special Autonomy status for
Papua, Jakarta has continuously undermined it. First, without
consulting the local administrative bodies, as was provided for in the
Special Autonomy arrangements, Jakarta divided Papua into three
administrative provinces even though later the Constitutional Court
deemed this illegal but two provinces remain in operation today.
Second, despite agreeing to permit Papuans to display their cultural
attributes, Jakarta reneged on this, arguing that it was promoting
separatism, especially with regard to the display of the Morning Star
and singing of Hai Tanahku Papua. In short, Papuans continue to view
Jakarta in bad faith and this is the main reason why the Cendrawasih
(Bird of Paradise) symbolising Papua, continues to fear the Garuda,
symbolising Indonesia.
Papuans Remain Unsatisfied and Suspicious

While some Papuan elites accepted the Special Autonomy proposal,
eventually, most in Papua were unhappy as hardliners in Jakarta
believed that too much had already been given to the Papuans and that
if no ‘roll-back’ takes place it will only be a matter of time before
Papuan independence becomes a reality. Also, most Papuans do not see
any major improvement in their livelihood, especially the violence
against them by the military, police and intelligence apparatus.
Instead, many Papuans would prefer to internationalise their plight
and seek a third party to settle the issue as they do not trust the
Jakarta elites and Indonesians in general. Jakarta, instead, realising
that the Papuans are being lost, has tried to launch various ‘peace
talks’, organised by the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Legal and
Security Affairs, the Indonesian Intelligence Agency, Home Affairs and
even Indonesian Resilience Agency (linked to the Defence Ministry) but
with no success. Incumbent President Bambang Yudhoyono has tasked the
Indonesian Institute of Sciences to draw up a ‘road map’ for Papua’s
future, but again little progress has been made. All these Indonesian
measures are aimed at circumventing internationalization of the Papuan
issue, which most Papuan elites demand but which Jakarta has been
unwilling to agree even though with regard to the Aceh settlement, a
third party, with the support of the Norwegian Government, succeeded
in making a breakthrough. Papuans are hoping for a similar opportunity
so as to ensure that the agreement reached between Jakarta and
themselves will be honoured.

In the meantime, as the deadlock continues, Papua continues to burn.
Violence by the security apparatus against Papuans continues to be
reported, with the military and police hunting the new separatist
leader, Goliat Tabuni, who succeeded Kelly Kwalik, who was shot dead
in December 2009 by security forces. With little or no hope of
progress, with the abuses and violence continuing, the traditional
separatist leaders are also losing their grip over their followers,
with many of these leaders accused of being covert operatives for
Jakarta. Amidst the continuing violence, Jakarta is rumoured to be
thinking of creating additional provinces in the territory, in a
traditional game of divide and rule, to weaken Papuan nationalism and
quest for independence. This has, instead, led to the rise of new
radical and hard-line younger leaders who are prepared to raise the
stakes through greater violence, to make Jakarta pay more dearly, and
more importantly bring the fight to Jakarta so that Indonesians and
the world community will pay greater attention to their plight. In
short, the HAMAS of Papua seems to be surfacing and if Jakarta
continues to neglect Papuans’ demands, the struggle is likely to
worsen, at great cost of life to both Papuans and Indonesians as a
whole, and where the international community, with stakes in Papua and
Indonesia, will also be affected. Not only will Indonesia’s democracy
but more importantly the very idea of Indonesia as a unitary state
will probably be under stress and test.

1. For deeper insights into the Papuan conundrum see Bilveer Singh,
Papua: Geopolitics and the Quest for Nationhood (New Brunswick, USA:
Transaction Press, 2008).

SMH: Papuans' Future an Open Question After Failure of Autonomy

MEDIA INFORMATION:

The Sydney Morning Herald
September 4, 2010
http://www.smh.com.au/world/papuans-future-an-open-question-after-failure-of-autonomy-20100903-14ucc.html

Papuans’ Future an Open Question After Failure of Autonomy

by Tom Allard

JAKARTA: A broad consensus is emerging in Indonesia that special
autonomy for the country’s fractious provinces of Papua and West
Papua has failed miserably.

> From military advisers to the President, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, to respected think tanks and the indigenous
population of the resource-rich region, there is near unanimity
that the policy introduced almost 10 years ago to placate
separatist sentiment has resulted in only deeper discontent.
However, there is little agreement on who, and what, is to
blame, or how to repair the situation.

As part of a dialogue to address simmering discontent in the
region, the Indonesian government would have to acknowledge and
apologise for the manipulated vote in 1969 that led to its
inclusion in the republic, said the Jakarta-based analyst for
the International Crisis Group, Sidney Jones, the author of two
recent reports on the provinces.

Ms Jones warned that ”increased radicalisation is likely” if
reconciliation efforts are not pursued by Dr Yudhoyono.

Jakarta’s failure to address human-rights abuses in Papua and
West Papua, the two Indonesian provinces that make up the
western half of the island of New Guinea, the continuing heavy
presence of security forces, an influx of migrants, rampant
corruption and persistent poverty are all undermining the
”special autonomy” offered to the region almost a decade ago.

Violence has worsened in the past two years, and the Papuan
People’s Council, the body set up under special autonomy to
represent indigenous values, decided to symbolically ”hand
back” special autonomy to the provincial parliament as part of
a wave of mass rallies that took place in June and July.

Ms Jones said Dr Yudhoyono must begin talks as a matter of
urgency, starting discussions informally to avoid ”posturing on
both sides” before engaging in a public reconciliation. New
governing arrangements must then follow for the region, which
remains the major source of separatist agitation across the
sprawling multi-ethnic nation.

”They are going to have to address the Act of Free Choice and
acknowledge that there was a manipulated process,” Ms Jones
said. ”An apology and an acknowledgement about it is needed to
get over the hump.”

The region, with its Melanesian indigenous population, was
initially excluded from the fledgling Indonesian state during
negotiations with the former Dutch colonial government,
remaining under the control of the Netherlands until the 1960s.

Western powers ceded to Jakarta’s long-standing demands for the
region’s inclusion in the republic, but only after a United
Nations sponsored vote of Papuans. Rather than a broad
referendum, a hand-picked group of just over 1000 Papuans voted
unanimously in the 1969 plebiscite to join Indonesia. The vote
was widely derided as farcical and unrepresentative, and it
remains a potent source of rancour among Papuans and their most
powerful weapon in challenging the legitimacy of Jakarta’s rule.

While Ms Jones does not advocate a new referendum on Papuan
independence, or view it as likely, it remains a central demand
of a coalition of Papuan groups and the Papuan People’s Council,
or Majelis Rakyat Papua, a body with authority to speak for the
Melanesian population under the special autonomy arrangements.

Jakarta has declined to even respond to the demands. Even so, it
may well be a disappointing exercise for independence advocates
as the two provinces’ population is now reckoned to be split
evenly between the indigenous people and migrants from elsewhere
in Indonesia.

Dr Yudhoyono, in his only concession to the unrest, agreed to
begin an ”audit” of the region’s special autonomy next year.

Jakarta is dissatisfied with special autonomy because the Papuan
provinces get more money from the central government than any
other – $1 billion a year, or about 10 times more than provinces
in Java – but have yet to see much economic progress.

A leading Papuan activist in the main city of Jayapura,
Frederika Korain, said the special autonomy funds were going to
non-Melanesian Papuans who dominate the economy.

”In some areas, all the shops belong to non-Papuans,” she said.

Ms Korain said any reconciliation would have to be preceded by
the end to abuses by Indonesian security forces, curbing the
growth of pro-Jakarta militias and a sincere effort to give
Papuans back their ”dignity”.

She flagged a continuing campaign of mass mobilisation by
indigenous Papuans. While most are determined to pursue
non-violent means to achieve their ends, there is a small but
growing element who support taking armed action.

President SBY intends to make evaluation of OTSUS after Ramadhan; DPRP's reaction

Bintang Papua, 31 August 2010

President SBY intends to make evaluation of OTSUS after Ramadhan

Responding to the political dynamics in West Papua where attention has been given to the Special Autonomy Law (OTSUS) for failing to improve the living conditions of the Papuan people, the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has begun to show that he has registered these developments.He has now said that he would soon make an evaluation of OTSUS in both Papua and West Papua. This will happen after the end of the fasting month, Ramadhan (which ends on 10 September).

During a one-hour meeting with members of the president’s special staff, they were told that the President had expressed his concern that, despite to large sums of money that have been allocated to Papua every year, the quality of life has not improved. The president believes that there is a need for a ‘Grand Design’ to deal comprehensively with the problems in West Papua.

He has said that the focus will be on improving the supply of foodstuffs, educational and health facilities and introducing an
affirmative policy to promote the role of the Papuan people.

As the first move, he would seek to improve communications between the central government and the DPRP, the DPRD, and the MRP.

The Grand Design would focus on a grand strategy, for the coming twenty years to develop several main sectors such as education, health and the people’s economy.

During the first five-year period they would investigate how many
Papuans had reached certain levels of education, how many hospitals had been built with OTSUS funds, how many doctors were working in the hospitals and so on.

Papua has been provided with plenty of money, which now amounts to Rp 28 trillion (approx. $2,800,000,000) which is far higher that the money allocated to other provinces. OTSUS money has risen from 1.9 trillion in 2002 to 3.5 trillion in 2008, then to 4.1 trillion in 2009, and even more in 2010.

Nevertheless, there have been many demands from the Papuan people to ‘return OTSUS to the central government’. There had been demonstrations in 2008, and now in 2010, people are calling for a referendum.

All this has drawn the attention of the president who has now decided to carry out an evaluation of OTSUS, in order to see whether this situation can be improved.

[This item is heavily abridged and is full of what I can only call
‘management speak’ about the government’s intentions.]
——————————–

Bintang Papua, 1 September 2010

The chairman of the DPRP, John Ibo and the chairman of the MRP, Agus Alua have said that the decision of the president to conduct an
evaluation of OTSUS is far too late. They pointed out that the OTSUS
law provides for the need to conduct an evaluation every three months.
Although an evaluation was undertaken by the DPRP in 2005, no one from the central government bothered to attend, even though they had been invited.

Nevertheless, an evaluation was very necessary. Whether the government was still keen to implement OTSUS would be discussed by the main executive bodies of the two provinces and the MRP at a meeting to be held in the third week of October.

According to Ibo, during the past nine years since the OTSUS law was
passed, he and others had been the subject of political suspicion and
stigmas, and accusations about the OPM. He himself has also been the
butt of criticism from the people about the implementation of
OTSUS. ‘Stigmatising people as OPM is an old yarn,’ he said. ‘We need a serious political discussion, in accord with the development of
democracy,’ he said

MRP chairman Agus Alua said that it is clear that OTSUS has failed in
four critical areas, health, education, the economy and the
infrastructure. But what is also important is that the dignity of the
Papuan people has been increasingly thwarted with Papuans being pushed aside or their very existence being threatened in their own land. He said that all this has nothing to do with money, but with their very right to life, their empowerment, the need for government to ‘side with’ he people, all of which the central government has failed to
understand. It’s not a question of money but the very right to life,
where Papuans are empowered in all aspects of political life. ‘This is
what we mean,’ he said.

‘But if the president now wants an evaluation of OTSUS, the people must be involved, without third party intervention. It is just between the people and the government, while the role of academics will be very important,’ he said.

The dean of the politics faculty of the Cenderawasih University, Derk
Vebluum said that he felt it was not too late to conduct the valuation.
As regard the four areas of concern, the economy, education, health and the infrastructure, there are no indicators available to measure
implementation. An example is about economic achievement, with Papuan women (‘mama-mama) not having a decent place for them to carry out their business. This has still not been attended to.

He said that the evaluation should involve the universities, the
executive, the provincial legislative assemblies , the MPR and the people.

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