Category Archives: Investigative Journalism

Medco in Manokwari: stepping up the pressure on land and community

From AwasMifee

January 20, 2014

Medco moved into Manokwari in 2008 to start an oil palm plantation. At that point it could still be counted as one of the pioneers of oil palm in West Papua.   A few years later, as large expanses of land for new plantations become increasingly hard to obtain in Sumatra and Kalimantan, more and more companies have been turning their eyes eastward to Papua’s vast forests. Yet given the huge inequalities in Papua, it is unlikely that any of these new plantation developments will be without its problems.

In the case of Medco, the new plantation has increased the pressure on land in a relatively densely populated agricultural area, potentially also increasing tensions between indigenous Papuans and transmigrants.

The land around Manokwari is mostly mountainous, except for one long broad plain stretching along the coast and into the interior. Much of this land was allocated for transmigration programs in the 1980s, and some of the migrants who came were employed as smallholders on the first oil palm plantation in Papua, run by the state-owned company PTPN II, which got its permit to operate in 1980.  Other  transmigrants farm food crops in this area, which is the only large area suitable for lowland agriculture near to Manokwari city. Many local Arfak people also live in the area, they are also farmers but tend to use the technique of shifting cultivation, while the transmigrants stick to their allocated two hectares.

This is the environment which Medco’s subsidiary PT Medcopapua Hijau Selaras moved into, occupying some of the forest areas unused by PTPN II and the transmigrants, and also westwards further along the plain. This agricultural environment and its mixed population structure is a very different context from some other areas where oil palm is expanding in Papua, such as the sparsely populated forests the Korindo and Daewoo groups chose for their plantations near Merauke.

Everywhere in Papua, the consent of local communities which hold customary land rights have to be obtained before a company can operate. However this is often treated as a formality, rather than giving communities a real choice to decide the future of their land. Medco has met this requirement by compensating traditional leaders at a rate of Rp 450,000 per hectare. The company also offers local Papuans smallholdings of two hectares of oil palm, which they would manage and then sell the fruit to the company.

450,000 per hectare is not much (around A$45 dollars). One place we visited told us that the chief had received 30 million Rupiah for the villages’ land (he wasn’t sure of how many hectares that was for). That meant signing away rights to the land for 35 years. However, in one year, he claimed, the farmers could make 30 million growing chilli on just a portion of that land. They felt cheated.

What’s more, negotiations and payment are made to the tribal chief only.  It is customary amongst the Arfak people that the chief receives all compensation paid to use the land, and does not share it with other families. However the whole community who lose their land to theplantation. In many places chocolate trees have been cleared, and the owner was not individually compensated. The Arfak people we spoke to did not make a problem of this however, or show any bitterness towards the tribal chief. Indeed they complained about how Medco had not followed through on its promises to build a new home for the tribal chief, seeing it as a betrayal of trust by the company.

In fact, it may be low, but 450,000 Rupiah is a higher level of compensation than any other oil palm plantation in Papua. The highest rate in the cluster of plantations around Merauke is Rp 300,000 per hectare, but some communities were convinced to sell for Rp 50,000 – 70,000 back in 2007. In Sorong, the Mooi people were cheated out of their land for Rp 6000 per hectare. However, in those other cases, the land is mostly forest. Medco’s area in Manokwari is either agricultural land or could be potentially used as agricultural land. If it were not being used for oil palm it would be used by small farmers to meet the food needs of this growing city. As a comparison, one hectare of paddy fields on Java would be sold for around two billion rupiah.

Before Medco came, there were existing tensions over land, which squeezing the communities yet further is likely to exacerbate. The problems arose because when the government originally brought transmigrants from other islands including Java and Timor, it didn’t seek agreement from the local customary landowners or provide compensation. Although it is now generally recognised that retrospective compensation must be paid, in many cases the cash is not forthcoming.

In some cases, the transmigrants have settled the issue themselves, paying off the required amount in monthly instalments.  Others quite rightly argue that the government brought them there, and so they are holding out for the government to meet its responsibility and pay up. But in that situation their future is very insecure, especially if they are smallholders on PTPN II’s plantation with just two hectares of palm trees which are rapidly becoming unproductive, and no clear title over the land.

The indigenous people are also in an increasingly precarious situation, in part because Medco has also taken so much land, making it harder to make a living from shifting cultivation as they have always done.

In general, the indigenous people and the transmigrants are aware of the other side’s difficult situation and endeavour to remain good neighbours without conflict breaking out. However it is inevitable that tensions are present, and without a resolution it could explode at any time.

The new plantation also brings environmental problems. Apart from clearing the lowland forest, the plantation is already causing severe problems with erosion and flooding. One river had widened by over 100m in just a few years since the forest was cut down and replaced with oil palm. Flooding has also intensified in a transmigration area between PTPN 2 and Medco’ s plantations, so much so that the government has erected flood danger notices along the edge of Medco’s concession. Floodwaters now regularly enter their houses.

Taking all the low lying land for an oil palm plantation means also that the Papuan farmers are moving into nearby mountainous land for their shifting cultivation plots. Clearing the forest on these steep slopes also increases the risk of flooding and landslides.

There are also a number of issues for the Papuan and transmigrant workers who are taken on by Medco as day-labourers. They are paid a flat 68,000 Rupiah per day, which is a low wage taking into account the high cost of living in Papua. Workers also reported that the company didn’t provide any safety equipment to day-labourers or small-holders who were
spraying weedkillers and pesticides.

Medco still wishes to extend the area it is cultivating, westwards towards Kebar district and eastwards back towards Manokwari city. However, it has reportedly met with opposition from indigenous people and also difficulty expanding the area of its permit: the original
location permit covered 13,850 hectares, but the land released by the forestry ministry was only 6,791 hectares, and in 2011 the company said it had paid compensation on 5930 hectares.

This article was first by our partners at awasMIFEE.

Forest devastation of customary land on the MIFEE estate (File photo)

Wilmar’s New ‘No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation’ Policy: What will it mean in Merauke?

From our partners at awasMifee

First Published: December 11, 2013

Apologies for the delay in republishing:  No donations mean no internet for West Papua Media

On 5th December, Wilmar International, one of Asia’s biggest agribusiness corporations and the world’s biggest palm oil trader, announced a broad new environmental and social policy, including a commitment to no deforestation and the principle of Free, Prior Informed Consent when dealing with indigenous communities.

As these new ethical criteria would apply not only to Wilmar’s own plantations but also other companies who supply the palm oil, sugar and soy that Wilmar trades, it would seem that this pledge might have a big effect on the plantation industry’s environmental record – especially for palm oil where Wilmar controls 45% of world trade.

The question is, will it be implemented? This new policy was launched at the same time as a deal between Wilmar and food and household products giant Unilever, which has its own target to only use traceable palm oil by the end of 2014. As more multinationals come under pressure to use less environmentally-damaging ingredients, the commercial benefits to Wilmar of appearing to be an environmental leader are clear.

However the company has frequently been accused of violating ethical standards that is has signed up to in the past – for example as a member of the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and recipient of funding from the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation(IFC). That means many groups with experience of the company’s track record are sceptical about this new commitment.

PT Anugerah Rejeki Nusantara: a test of whether the new policy is serious.

In West Papua Wilmar has plans for two 40,000 hectare sugar-cane plantations in Merauke and two more in neighbouring Mappi regency, and these could be a key test for the company’s new policy. If these plantations for ahead, they will clearly contravene the ethical standards. Let’s take a look at the situation with PT Anugerah Rejeki Nusantara (PT ARN), one of those plantations:

  • No deforestation. Wilmar has committed to end deforestation in High Carbon Stock and High Conservation Value forest. The definition is quite broad and includes most forest that has not been cleared within the last ten years. PT ARN’s concession is an ecologically-rich area, largely forested, with some grassland and swamps.
  • No peat. Wilmar says it will not start plantations on peat of any depth. Data from Wetlands International shows intermittent shallow and medium peat within PT ARN’s concession.
  • Respect the rights of local and indigenous people to give or withhold their Free, Prior, Informed Consent (FPIC). PT ARN has been trying to convince communities in the area to hand over their land for two years now, but many people are still determinedly opposed. A recent study in four villages affected by PT ARN revealed that the company was falling far short of FPIC principles. Where people have clearly not consented, the company keeps making its approaches, until the community feels it really has no choice. Often Wilmar only speaks with community and clan leaders individually, which was causing the seeds of conflict within the village. Security forces brought to discussions also have an intimidating effect. There are other tools of deception too – in one village PT ARN’s Public Relations Manager even pretended to be a priest to get the people’s support.

Wilmar’s policy covers a number of other areas, such as workers’ rights and dealing with land conflict. The full text can be read here.

What about the Ganda Group?

Wilmar commits itself to stop deforestation and development on peat immediately, and will not start buying from any suppliers who are deforesting or developing peat. Existing suppliers have until the end of 2015 to comply. Of particular interest is to see how this will affect the Ganda Group (Agro Mandiri Semesta Plantations), a palm oil company which sells its produce to Wilmar.

Wilmar has a special relationship with Ganda Group, which is owned by Ganda Sitorus, the younger brother of Wilmar founder Martua Sitorus. In recent years the Ganda Group have taken over plantations which do not meet Wilmar’s previous ethical commitments to the RSPO and IFC. The most notorious case is in Jambi, Sumatra, where after going through the motions of two years of IFC-facilitated mediation to resolve a land conflict with the indigenous Suku Anak Dalam Batin Sembilan, Wilmar suddenly sold it’s subsidiary PT Asiatic Persada to the Ganda Group, rather than abide by any agreements produced by that mediation. On Saturday 7th December, the Ganda Group once again violently evicted Suku Anak Dalam communities which had reoccupied their ancestral land in the plantation.

The Ganda Group also has plans for two plantations in Merauke: PT Agrinusa Persada Mulia and PT Agriprima Cipta Persada. These companies are also accused of deceiving local villagers and paying shockingly low compensation rates, as well as clearing forest for an oil palm nursery before receiving a plantation permit. The plantations, which also involve clearing natural forest, would clearly not meet the RSPO standards which Wilmar has signed up to in its bid to be seen as a responsible company, but the Ganda Group is unencumbered by such commitments.

However now Wilmar’s policy states that it it won’t be buying from companies that are clearing forests. Does that mean the Ganda Group are going to have to look elsewhere to sell their tainted palm oil?

AwasMIFEE wrote to Wilmar on 6th December to ask whether its new ethical policy would mean that it would be cancelling its plans in Merauke. No response was received by the time this article was published.

 

opening fire

Shootings, killings, beatings, arrests as Hundreds flee to jungle after Indon Police open fire on peaceful KNPB demo

From the entire West Papua Media team in PNG and West Papua

November 28, 2013

WPM apologises for the delay in posting due to the remote location of the WPM team, and the delays in finding independent witnesses to help in cross-checking of this extreme situation.  This situation is developing and will be updated as more information comes to hand.

Key developments:

  • Indonesian police open fire on peaceful protesters in Jayapura, with at least four gunshot wounds and one death;
  • West Papuan activists and families forced to flee to the jungle for safety;
  • Indonesian security forces conduct scores of raids, sweeps and offensives against West Papuan civilians;
  • Attacks happen during visit of National Police Chief General Sutarman
  • over 200 people arrested across West Papua;
  • Journalists attacked by Indonesian police;

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Images from the crackdown in Jayapura (Credit:West Papua Media/MS); Images from Arrests in Timika (Credit: KNPBNews.com); and Wamena (Credit: WestPapuaMedia/KNPBNews.com).

Indonesian forces have again opened fire on a peaceful Jayapura gathering of about 500 people held by the West Papua National Committee (KNPB), with the shooting of at least 4 demonstrators, and the confirmed death of at least one, on November 26.  A total of 15 people are still in serious condition in hospitals around Jayapura with a range of wounds sustained during the live fire dispersal by Indonesian police.

In the worst single act of Indonesian state violence since the October 19 2011 crackdown on the Third Papuan Peoples Congress, ongoing sweeps and arrests have been continuing in the time since, causing most members of the KNPB fleeing with their families into the relative safety of the jungle.  Unconfirmed reports have also surface that the police have called in the Indonesian Army (TNI) to hunt for KNPB members.

Correspondents have also reported to West Papua Media that Indonesian radio stations in Papua have been broadcasting repeated messages from the Indonesian police against all pro-independence forces, starting with the KNPB.  “We will use force to break apart the KNPB,” a senior Indonesian Police figure in Papua was heard to say on all Jayapura radio stations early on Wednesday morning.  Unconfirmed reports have said that these broadcasts have been repeated hourly across West Papua, with the National Police Chief also issuing warnings that separatism will not be accepted any more.

The rally was part of a nationwide day of mobilisations in solidarity with the opening of the Free West Papua Campaign office in Papua New Guinea on November 28.  31 people were arrested by Police in Timika, and 3 arrested in Sorong as KNPB chapters there also organised rallies and prayers to support the opening of the PNG office, which is being held with the involvement of thousands of people throughout Papua New Guinea, including senior members of the PNG Parliament.

A rally in Wamena drew several thousand enthusiastic and cheering supporters wearing traditional dress (many bedecked in the banned Morning Star flag) on a long march mass action, led by KNPB Wamena region Chairman, Simion Dabi  This was the only rally where police were vastly outnumbered by participants, and police blockaded several points along the route but did not attempt to prevent the rally from going ahead.

Jayapura
The Jayapura shooting victim, KNPB activist Matthius Tengget from near Oksibil in the Star Mountains, died of his wounds in custody.  However, his body was not retrieved until Wednesday evening after it was dumped into the lake, allegedly by those members of the Brimob paramilitary police units who shot him as they were conducting the dispersal.  At time of writing, his family were conducting his funeral in Sentani.

According to a statement from KNPB General Chairman Victor Yeimo, currently in Abepura prison, “KNPB and family members of the victims are also looking for four (4) other KNPB members that are missing: their whereabouts are unknown or their bodies have not yet been found. Three of the victims carry the Mul surname and the fourth Lambe. We strongly suspect that the police shot them and disposed of their bodies.”

“Until now we are still looking for possible victims of yesterday’s mass action who were most presumably shot and disappeared: in their attempt to disperse yesterday’s demonstration, the Police and the Mobile Brigade fired a lot of shots and they chased many demonstrators towards Buper, the Housing Complex III, Ekspo, until Iyoka and all the way to the edge of Sentani Lake,” said Yeimo.

Up to 15 people were hospitalised from both gunshots and beatings, including a group of three young women from the Yahukimo dormitory who were savagely beaten by police during their arrests.  More reports have also been given that scores of female activists were rounded up and severely beaten by Indonesian police and military officers.

The shootings were under the operational field command of the notorious hardliner Deputy Jayapura Police Chief Kiki Kurnia, Abepura area POlice commander Deky Hursepunny, together with Jayapura Police Chief Alfred Papare, with the Deputy Papua
Police Chief Paulus Waterpauw and Papua Police Chief Tito Karnavian allegedly sighted monitoring the situation from their private Kijang vehicles.

Police have predictably launched a propaganda offensive across its tame colonial media networks in West Papua, accusing the KNPB of conducting a riot.  However, stringers for West Papua Media, independent witnesses in the busy Waena shopping area, and KNPB spokespeople have all vehemently denied riotous behaviour by the protesters, instead describing how a peaceful sit-in was brutally dispersed under the orders of a cohort of four senior police officers, who have been personally responsible for ordering significant and ongoing human rights abuses against KNPB members.

Direct Witness to Brutality
A survivor of Tuesday’s violence fled to Papua New Guinea immediately after the shooting, was directly interviewed by West Papua Media  – unidentified for their own safety – and has described how police opened fire without targeting, instead firing indiscriminately into the crowd.

Before the shooting, a mass of people had gathered in the field outside the Expo Waena bus terminal and market in front of the Museum, mainly sitting and chatting while listening to speeches.  According to the witness, police surrounded the gathering on three sides, and the protest leader Buchtar Tabuni attempted to negotiate with senior police present, including the Alfred Papare, Kiki Kurnia and Deky Hursepunny. As it became clear that police were refusing to negotiate with Tabuni, demonstrators agreed to maintain the peaceful action.

According to the witness, Senior police then yelled to the crowd, ordering them to disperse.  However, almost immediately, and without further warning of escalation of the threat, Police commanders ordered the front ranks of police in front of the bus terminal to open fire.

“When the the shooting started, as I was running, I saw the KapolSek Deky Hursepunny and Kapolresta Alfred Papare standing at the gate, directing his police where to fire,” the witness said.

Upon questioning, the witness testified that police initially fired tear gas, but switched very quickly to automatic weapons.   The witness also confirmed that instead of individually targeting demonstrators, police seemed to be firing wildly into the crowd, firing indiscriminately.

Both the order to open fire without warning, and the subsequent excessive use of firearms against civilians are direct violations of both Indonesian and international law.  International Lawyer Jennifer Robinson, Convener of the International Lawyers for West Papua and currently meeting in PNG, told West Papua Media that “This use of excessive force against KNPB members is in breach of international law and Indonesia’s own police regulations on the use of force”.

“This latest incident falls within a repeated pattern of the use of excessive and lethal force by Indonesian police against peaceful activists in West Papua which is indicative of a broader state policy. Continued impunity for the police involved is unacceptable and the failure to punish gives rise to command and state responsibility,” Robinson said.

Many beatings were meted out on KNPB members by Police during the arrests, with allegations that rifle butts were repeatedly used – a standard practice for the Indonesian police against peaceful demonstrators in Papua.

Plain clothes police special forces, described by the witness as “Polisi Preman” (Police gangsters), then continued two days of terror against West Papuan civilians, some in no way connected with the civil resistance movement.  This campaign, at time of writing, shows no sign of lessening.

“We were running across Waena.  Police used many rental cars and were driving around in balaclavas like terrorists, pointing automatic weapons outside their vehicles, and shooting now around Perumnas 1, causing all who could see it to hide in their houses.  At the same time a black Avanza stopped in front of us, followed by white and red Avanzas, pointing weapons at all Papuans present. We ran, because we knew we were about to be shot – we had to seek safety with Indonesian transmigrants, who were unaware of the situation,” the witness told West Papua Media wearily.

“After police shoot the demonstrators, participants fled to the forest.  Police then conducted a brutal sweep, targeting anyone who was wearing dreadlocks, beard, or even wearing sunglasses, and arresting them all,” the witness said.  Civilians have fled in panic, and the witness described Waena as deserted when they fled.  Families of those at the demonstrations have fled to the jungle.  It is not known of normal social functions are continuing, due to the difficulty in getting direct contact with sources in Jayapura.

Our witness reported that two days prior to the demonstration, Indonesian army helicopters were searching extensively around the hills in areas that would be the the first point of refuge for civilian after any shooting.

The witness survivor believes that this indicated that the shootings by police were premeditated and planned, although West Papua Media has been unable to independently confirm this.  However the attacks on protesters occurred just prior to the arrival at Sentani airport of National Police Chief General Sutarman, who has exploited the lack of honest reportage by colonial media to issue more threats against any Papuans who dare dream they can freely express themselves.

“We will take firm action against groups or individuals wanting to separate Papua from Indonesia because Papua is part of Indonesia,” State media Antara quoted Sutarman telling the colonial press in Jayapura.

Tabloid Jubi reported that the Papua Deputy Police Chief Waterpauw has denied KNPB the right to freedom of expression, permanently. ” I made it clear to the group West Papua National Committee ( KNPB ), immediately stop the steps that are likely to violence . Whatever the form of their intention and desire to perform activities in public hearings, (it) will never be given permission or recommendation to implement it , because we know the purpose of the organisation and their desire is clear , (they) want to form a state , split off and so on , “said Waterpauw on Tuesday ( 26/11 ) evening in Jayapura City police headquarters.

An independent international observer in Jayapura contacted by West Papua Media just prior to publication, speaking on condition of anonymity, went even further than the witness now in PNG, stating unequivocally that the crackdown was a “premeditated, highly engineered manufacturing of consent of the type that Tito Karnavian is such a master of, just like his OTK killings.”

“It beggars belief that Karnavian, hoping to please his boss – or more to the point those who would seek to replace the boss with Karnavian – would not be the engine of of a textbook counterinsurgency operation to smash a pesky bunch of separatists.  The only problem is, those separatists are unarmed and were conducting a peaceful gathering.  It looks like the whole thing was organised for a long time.  It is well beyond time those gangsters were held to account,” the observer said, naming Karnavian, Kurnia, Papare and Waterpauw as the perpetrators of massive human rights abuses against Papuan civilians.

The observer added that they saw the gathering just prior to its dispersal and can vouch for the gathering’s peaceful conduct, but was disturbed at the large number of security forces that were surrounding Waena.  “There were at least ten platoons of Brimob, and hundreds of swanggi (ghosts) everywhere, surrounding on three sides the KNPB sitting in a park,” the observer said – confirming maps drawn by the survivor witness.  “They were itching for brutality.  How is this Policing?”

A total of twenty eight people were arrested, but were released by Wednesday night.  KNPB national spokesperson Wim Rocky Medlama told SuaraPapua.com that they are fed up with the police’s actions, which are arrogant and excessive. “This is too excessive. And I think that the police have much to learn. So that they undertake their duties in accordance with the orders”, as quoted in SuaraPapua.com.

Olga Hamadi, the coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KontraS) Papua, also told SuaraPapua that the police’s actions were excessive and the pattern of arrests should stop.

“I’ve only just heard this information. I think that the police are too excessive. Patters of arrests such as this should no longer be necessary. This is included under the rights of each person to express themselves. Moreover this is a democratic country right”, she said in an SMS message sent to Suara Papua, adding that people expressing their views should not be attacked and arrested. “They should be given space. The issue of expressing views in public should not be responded to with arrests and law enforcement. If [the police] are going to be like this it won’t solve the Papuan problem”, said Hamadi.

More arrests
Earlier on Tuesday morning at 8:13 local time. KNPB Secretary-General Ones Suhun was arrested with 6 members of the KNPB (Assa Asso, Okram Wanimbo, Sam Lokobal, Meminda (Mendenas) Sol, Konoru Wenda, and Bonsan Mirin) by Indonesian Police outside the Student dormitories at Putaran Perumnas 3, Waena, Jayapura.  They had just begun to hand out leaflets about the afternoon’s peaceful rally calling for the respect of West Papua’s right to self-determination. Most were released by Wednesday night.

Reports received by West Papua Media overnight from distressed sources fleeing through the jungle have confirmed that a further series of brutal sweeps and raids had occurred all afternoon and evening on Tuesday and continuing through Wednesday, with unconfirmed reports of Puma helicopters being used to find activists.  Hundreds of heavily armed Police were used to raid the offices of the KNPB Secretariat on Tuesday afternoon, also confiscating  all the contents and destroying what was left.

At least thirty more people were reportedly arrested overnight on the 26th, although this has not been independently verified by West Papua Media, however Buchtar Tabuni was moved by his supporters to a safe location.

Across Papua
In Sorong, the KNPB rally was also forcibly broken up by Police, and Marthinus Yohame (regional Chairman of KNPB), Kantius Heselo (Vice chair KNPB Sorong), Natalis Surabut Gebby Mambrasar, Nius Loho and Welem Surabut, were arrested for holding the rally, but were released overnight.

In TImika,  31 people were arrested by a Joint Police and TNI taskforce at Kelly Kwalik’s Cemetery Park at about 8.15 in the morning as they began to gather for their demonstration.  Police also arrested The Chairman of KNPB Region Timika, Steven Itlay and the chair of Mimika’s Parliament, Abihut Degey  while leading peaceful rally in demand the right of Self-determination in West Papua and are being held still at the Police Post, Mile 32. Their names are:
1. Steven Itlay
2. Abihud Degey
3. Billy Hagawal
4. Dony Mote
5. Petrus Bobii
6. Bony Bora
7. Yulianus Edoway
8. Paulus Doo
9. Martinus Pekey
10. Paulina Pakage
11. Agustin Pekey
12. Sony Ukago
13. Daniel Kotouki
14. Seprianus Edoway
15. Argenes Pigay
16. Menase Dimi
17. Timotius Kossay
18. Welius Kogoya
19. Demianus Kogoya
20. Kasianus Kamke
21. Aduart Suruan
22. Melianus Gobay
23. Pais Nasia
24. Makson Kotouki
25. Maria Piligain
26. Markus Entama
27. Yustinus Pigome
28. Sior Heselo
29. Semuel Edoway
30. Agus Itlay
31. Yakonias Womsiwor

Biak also saw its KNPB rally broken up police, with several arrests reported and injuries sustained.  KNPB Biak Chairman Apollos Sroyer reported to West Papua Media that the actions of police were again excessive in preventing a prayer session from going ahead, using scores of police and troops to blockade access to the church.  Police dispersed the crowd later in the afternoon.

In Manokwari, KNPB members were also banned from holding any events in solidarity with the PNG office opening, but were able to negotiate with the hundreds of riot police, and the rally went ahead with several hundred participants, dispersing peacefully after a prayer in the late afternoon.

In remote Yahukimo in the highlands, an action supported by KNPB Yakuhimo in support of the IPWP/ILWP meeting at Parliament Haus in PNG on Nov 27, and FWPPNG office opening in PNG was held in front of the Ruko Putra store.  The action was carried out in face of threats from Brimob officers and a platoon of fully armed TNI of Kodim Wamena 1702 (Battalion 752), and also 15 Kopassus special forces brought in from Jakarta.  They were backed up by a large but unknown number of police from from POLRES Dekei Yahukimo under the command of the local Polresta Eliakin Ap.

The forces presence was was requested by Ones Pahabol, the Yahukimo Bupati (District Head). Ones Pahabol is also the local head of the Committee of the 17th District of the GIDI (Indonesian Evangelical Church), who is considered extremely pro-Indonesian.  According to KNPB sources in Yahukimo, Pahabol’s reason for requesting military support was to break up any KNPB demonstration, and he ordered the dispersal of the KNPB activists because he was prohibiting the expression of the KNPB in public.

However the KNPB reported that even though the local government, police and local church committee refused to give permission for the rally to go ahead, the district head of gidi church did give them permission. However the KNPB commented that it was “as if the church were giving permission to the military to kill their parishioners.  Despite this military threat we give our full support to the IPWP meetings happening in PNG on the 27th – 29th.” said a KNPB spokesperson from Yahukimo.

Media Attacks
Several Journalists were also attacked by police during the Waena dispersal, forcing an apology from the Jayapura police chief Alfred Papare.   Police officers reportedly beat and threatened the journalists at a scene behind the administrative court offices , Waena , Jayapura.  According to a report in SuaraPapua.com, the three West Papuan journalists that suffered intimidation from police, were Aprila Wayar ( tabloidjubi.com ) , Micelle Gobay ( SKH torch Papua ) , and Arnold Belau ( suarapapua.com ), Hengky Yeimo (MajalahSelangkah) as well as a national reporter , Alvarez Oru Maga ( Reuters )

In addition, independent media website Suara Papua has been subjected to a denial of service attack, after they published accounts conflicting from the official police version of the story.  It is believed by many season observers on cyber conflict in Indonesia, that this is the work of a shadowy  cyber- division of the Indonesian police trained and funded by the Australian government, despite the fake outrage generated by the Canberra-Jakarta spy scandal.

In news to hand just before publication, two more bodies have been recovered from around Jayapura suffering gunshot wounds, though it is unconfirmed whether they were victims of the November 26 shootings, or further murders by security forces.

A highly credible source reported to West Papua Media that on November 27 at 3.30pm, a Papuan youth named Ottis Membilang (17), was shot by two TNI soldiers.  According to witnesses, Membilang was standing on the side of the road in front if his home near the Mega store at Waena when 2 TNI members arrived in an unidentified vehicle and shot and killed him for no apparent reason.  This is within metres of the area that West Papua Media’s witnessing survivor of November 26′s violence described troops and police  driving around in Avanzas, wearing balaclavas and threatening to shoot all nearby Papuans.

At the time that the first victim Mathius Tengget was being buried by his family, another body was found at Koya Barat (West Koya), at Wlara Tami near Skouw. KNPB sources have yet to confirmed if the body belongs to one of those missing since Tuesday’s brutality. The Tami River has long been a notorious dumping ground for victims of the Indonesian security forces’ Ninjas, as the river after rain sweeps all bodies far out into the Pacific Ocean into shark infested waters.

More to Come.

West Papua Media

Three Years of MIFEE (part 3): As the forest is felled where’s the rice?

Special Investigation
First Published: October 23, 2013 by our friends at awasMifee

Three years ago, on August 11 2010, Agriculture Minister Suswono travelled to remote Kampung Serapu, inland from Merauke in the south-east corner of West Papua, He was there to launch the Merauke Integrated Food And Energy Estate(MIFEE). It was an ambitious plan for 1.28 million hectares of high-tech agribusiness development, with the aim of restoring Indonesia’s national self-sufficiency in rice and various basic food crops, bringing this vast untamed wilderness under the plough.

Of course, the land was not empty. Merauke is the home of the Malind-Anim, many of whom live in isolated villages deep in the forests or along the coastal plains, and an integral part of that forest system that provides for most of their needs, material and cultural. They have had to struggle to comprehend this inconceivably different fate that has been decided for them in distant offices, and in many cases, are having to learn to resist plans they know will devastate their livelihood.

Now MIFEE has reached its third birthday, although it is unlikely there were celebrations anywhere to mark the anniversary. Certainly not on the ground: the forests of Merauke only echo with worry as tragic stories of deception, intimidation, inter-community conflict, forest destruction and even starvation pass from village to village. MIFEE’s proponents are hardly satisfied either since development plans are advancing much more slowly than they hoped, and the Jakarta-based media has made it seem that by 2012 MIFEE was all but over: “MIFEE reduced by 80%”, “Food Estate moves to East Kalimantan”, the headlines have proclaimed.

After three years it is time for a progress check on MIFEE, and to set the record straight, because there is an awful lot of conflicting information out there. Different vested interests, pulling in different directions, have caused great confusion, and a lack of publicly available information hasn’t helped.

Agriculture minister Suswono’s latest public comment on the issue was in late July 2013. “MIFEE is still on”1 , he said. Undeniably MIFEE is very much still alive and it is one of the most audacious land grabs currently taking place in Indonesia, possibly globally. It is just looking less and less like the high-tech rice estate Suswono promised.

The problem is Jakarta that is 3700km from Merauke, and so it has been possible for two quite different understandings of MIFEE to develop in parallel. People in Merauke, and others who are concerned with the fate of the forests and indigenous Papuans, look at the line of companies waiting to invest in the area and call that MIFEE. It includes some of the largest oil palm and industrial forestry plantations anywhere in Indonesia, as well as plenty of sugar cane. This plantation plan has come to represent MIFEE as it is being experienced in Merauke.

It is quite a contrast to the version of MIFEE which was envisaged in Jakarta, which required just as much land, if not more, but aimed to be more diverse, better managed and more productive than the typical plantations model. In this version the land would be divided into 5000 hectare bundles in ten integrated clusters, and developed in stages over twenty years. This version of MIFEE was designed as the answer to Indonesia’s shortfall in the production of basic foodstuffs such as rice, soya and sugar, large amounts of which are currently imported. MIFEE was to be Indonesia’s new rice granary. Jakarta’s version of MIFEE, being an ambitious and visionary plan, has been taken up as an important part of Indonesia’s development strategy.

Either way, the losers at the end of the day, of course, are the Malind people. Some might say it makes little difference if your ancestral forest is destroyed for paddy fields or for an oil palm plantation and course that’s true. Nevertheless, it is important to understand how these two parallel versions of MIFEE emerged, how they continue to coexist alongside one another, and crucially, how the image of MIFEE as a vital national food security project has continued to facilitate the start of Papua’s plantation explosion, without ever admitting that the two versions of the mega-project weren’t exactly the same thing. This essay will examine in some detail the parallel realities of MIFEE, together with some of the supporting policy that has been emerging over the last few years to support it and the wider paradigm of top-down development in West Papua.

MIFEE (Jakarta Version)

Wind the clock back to 2010. States and companies were buying up land all over the world in the wake of the 2008 food ‘crisis’ that had sent agricultural commodity prices soaring. A major land deal had just fallen through where Saudi investors had planned to buy up 500,000 hectares of Southern West Papua as part of a 1.9 million hectare ‘rice estate’. Local politicians were keen to find replacements. National politicians concurred – like many other countries, Indonesia had got caught up in the global panic wave of wanting to ensuring its future food security in an increasingly uncertain world. More immediately, Indonesia has for some time been dependent on imports for some key commodities such as rice and sugar, affecting its trade balance.

And so the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate was born. 1.28 million hectares were allocated for the plan, based on industrialised farming and modern management techniques. A map was drawn up with ten clusters, each with it’s own target crops and time-scale. Projected outputs for ‘food crops’ were even supplied: 1.95 million tons of rice, 2.02 million tons of maize, 167,000 tons of soya beans, beef from 64,000 cows . Oil palm and sugar cane were also part of the grand design, but limited to 20% and 30% of the total cultivated area respectively.

The MIFEE launched on August 11th 2010 was an ambitious plan, and several food and seed companies expressed their interest. State-owned enterprises said they were ready to get on board, supplying seeds and fertilizer, creating farmer-owned enterprises that could market by-products of rice cultivation and generate electricity from waste.

However, very swiftly there was no new news. There was some conflict with the Papuan provincial administration, which felt slighted by having been bypassed when MIFEE was created. Another obstacle was that it seemed like nobody wanted to foot the bill for the infrastructure development needed. What’s more, somewhat amazingly for such a major and complex development, no new body was set up to oversee MIFEE’s implementation. We could be forgiven for thinking that from the outset, no-one really had any intention to ever implement this MIFEE (Jakarta Version) at all.

 MIFEE (Merauke Version)

Suswono travelled to Merauke in August 2010 to launch MIFEE, and was photographed shaking hands with the leader of Merauke Regency at the time, Johanes Gluba Gebze. Gluba Gebze smiled as he held a ribbon-wrapped copy of the MIFEE (Jakarta Version) Grand Design, but maybe he didn’t let on that he had other plans that might sabotage the food estate.

launching mifee

In the months of July and August 2010 at least 20 location permits were issued or renewed by Gluba Gebze’s local government. Only one of these permits was for food crops other than oil palm or sugar cane, but there were several industrial forestry permits. The location of these permits encompassed nearly all the land in Merauke Regency, except for a few protected areas, stretching far beyond the boundaries of the ten clusters allocated in the MIFEE (Jakarta Version) plan. Many of these permits were for the legal maximum size of 40,000 hectares each – in Papua plantations are permitted to be twice as big as elsewhere in Indonesia.

What could be the reason for this frenzy of permits? Well, in late August 2010 there were elections for a new regency leader. Gluba Gebze had already been in power for two full terms so he wasn’t eligible to stand, but had a favoured candidate that he hoped would help him with his ambition of creating a new province of South Papua and becoming the governor. Could the permits have bankrolled this election campaign?2

That candidate did not win the election, but it is these initial location permits, together with others issued before July 2010, that form the backbone of MIFEE (Merauke Version). In a sense this is the real MIFEE, because it is this onslaught of plantation development that the Malind people are currently having to deal with.

 Which companies are investing in MIFEE?

The location permits given out by John Gluba Gebze are only the first stage in a legal process a company must follow before it can develop a new plantation. After that, an environmental impact assessment must be prepared and the forestry department must agree to release the land from the state forest estate. The company must also show that it has obtained the consent of indigenous landowners and compensated them for use of the land during the lifetime of the plantation, before it can apply for the final permit.

Faced with various obstacles, not all the companies have continued with their plans, but many have persevered, and so a huge amount of land continues to be under immediate threat.

Although the non-active concessions may of course be re-activated or reassigned, to look at the actual developments that are taking place right now gives a more accurate picture of how MIFEE is shaping up. So here’s the key data on plantation development in Merauke, as of August 2013, three years after MIFEE’s launch.

  •  Since 2007 around 80 initial location permits have been issued, but not all are being actively pursued. Somme permits have been revoked.
  • At least twelve major corporate groups are actively trying to start new plantations, between them operating 24 subsidiary companies.
  • Four corporate groups (Korindo, Daewoo International, Agro Mandiri Semesta and Central Cipta Murdaya) are developing eight oil palm plantations estimated to cover around 304,000 hectares.
  • Six corporate groups (Wilmar, Rajawali, Astra Agro Lestari, Mayora, Medco and Central Cipta Murdaya) are investing in sugar cane, planning eleven plantations on land estimated at around 330,000 hectares.
  • Between two and four companies wish to develop industrial forestry plantations, using up to 459,000 hectares. (including Medco and Texmaco which are definitely active, Moorim (status currently unclear) and newcomer PT Wahana Samudra Sentosa, which we don’t know much about yet)
  • Only one company, the somewhat mysterious PT China Gate Agriculture Development is definitely interested in farming food crops other than oil palm and sugar cane. Its permit is for 20,000 hectares, which it will use for cassava Another company, PT Kharisma Agri Pratama, part of the Modern Group, is also reportedly still active in the area, although there has been no recent information to confirm this.
  • That means that the grand total of land to be used in Merauke Regency, based on currently active companies only, can be estimated at 1,213,667 hectares.3
Company Name Parent Company Permit Size Acquired land from customary owners? Started Land clearing?
PT Berkat Citra Abadi Korindo (possibly sold to Daewoo) 40000 Yes Yes
PT Bio Inti Agrindo Daewoo International 39900 Yes Yes
PT Papua Agro Lestari Daewoo International 39800 Yes Yes
PT Dongin Prabhawa Korindo 39800 Yes Yes
PT Hardaya Sawit Papua Central Cipta Murdaya 31507 Possibly No
PT Central Cipta Murdaya Central Cipta Murdaya 40000 Possibly No
PT Agrinusa Persada Mulia Agro Mandiri Semesta (Ganda Group) 40000 Yes Yes
PT Agriprima Cipta Persada Agro Mandiri Semesta (Ganda Group) 33540 Yes
TOTAL OIL PALM 304547
PT Cenderawasih Jaya Mandiri Rajawali Group 22145 Yes Yes
PT Karya Bumi Papua Rajawali Group 22145 Yes Yes
PT Anugerah Rejeki Nusantara Wilmar international 27457 Only a small amount No
PT Lestari Subur Indonesia Wilmar International 40000 No No
PT Hardaya Sugar Papua Central Cipta Murdaya 44812 No No
PT Papua Daya Bio Energi Medco Group 13396 No For trial farm
PT Tebu Wahana Kreasi Medco Group 20282 No For trial farm
PT Dharma Agro Lestari Astra Agro Lestari Group 40000* No No
PT Randu Kuning Utama Mayora Group 40000* No No
PT Swarna Hijau Indah Mayora Group 30000* No No
PT Kurnia Alam Nusantara Mayora Group 30000* No No
TOTAL SUGAR-CANE 330237*
PT Selaras Inti Semesta Medco Group 169000 Yes Yes
PT Merauke Rayon Jaya Texmaco Group 206800 No No
Wahana Samudera Sentosa 79033 No No
Plasma Nutfah Malind Papua 64050 No No
TOTAL INDUSTRIAL FORESTRY 518883
China Gate Agriculture Development 20000 No No
Kharisma Agri Pratama 40000 No No
FOOD CROPS 60000
TOTAL 1213667

* = estimated

Three years later, the impacts of these plantations are being felt. Local people complain that they have been tricked out of their land, compensation has been inadequate, conflicts have emerged between local people, ancient forests and other ecosystems have been destroyed, sago groves damaged, forest animals have become hard to find, people have experienced hunger and children have even died of malnutrition, rivers and swamps have been polluted, military presence has increased, people resisting companies have been threatened as separatists, local people cannot get work with the companies or work for low wages and without contracts, companies break their promises to build community facilities. These impacts are explored in greater depth in Three Years of MIFEE – part 2.

This is only the beginning… of the twenty-four companies holding permits, only eight companies have started land clearing or planting. It is believed that fourteen have yet to start paying for land. That means a lot of the worst impacts have yet to be felt.

The graphic details.

Map 1: MIFEE as seen from Jakarta 

To help visualise the different plans for Merauke, here are a selection of maps which indicate where the two plans fit together and where they diverge. You can click on them to see them as big as we can make them, because unfortunately we don’t have access to higher-resolution versions. First of all, here is a map of MIFEE as envisaged by Jakarta, showing the clusters which were designed to be centres for food production. This recent version has changed slightly from the one published in the original MIFEE grand design.

cluster map

Map 2: Permits for Plantations

The next map is the latest version we have available of the map of location permits given to investors, produced by the Merauke local government. It is undated, but is probably about a year old. That means there are a few permits which are not shown: three subsidiaries of the Mayora Group, Wilmar subsidiary, PT Lestari Subur Indonesia and forestry company PT Wahana Samudra Sentosa. Texmaco is also not shown as that company is trying to start an industrial timber plantation based on old permits obtained from the national government.

active investments 2013

Well, to look at that map it doesn’t seem like there is going to be any forest left at all! That is the result of John Gluba Gebze’s permit bonanza in 2010. At the time, the big white hole in the centre of the map in Ngguti District was occupied by Kertas Nusantara’s forestry permit. Texmaco would be in the North-Eastern white area, in Muting and Ulilin Districts. The only other white areas on the map, which have not been allocated for plantations are designated conservation forests.

Map 3 Which areas are currently under threat from plantations?

As we know, not all those companies are not moving forward with their investments. To give an indication of which land is most directly under threat the following map shows the plantations concessions where it is known the companies are still active on the ground, or pursuing the additional permits they need before they can start planting. Mayora’s location is estimated based on reports of the areas the company is not active. Texmaco and PT Wahana Samudra Sentosa are not shown on this map, as there is insufficient data about the location of their concessions.concession map

Map 4: How oil palm and sugar cane plantations have overtaken the food estate plan.

How do the maps match up? First of all, let’s take a look at the clusters allocated for the food and energy estate super-imposed on a map of the plantation permits. The MIFEE clusters are hatched and the areas covered by plantation permits are coloured. Areas allocated to oil palm plantations are shown in green, sugar cane in blue, other food crops in yellow and industrial forestry in brown. A darker colour indicates the company is currently active.

mifee clusters compared to plantation permits

From this map you can see that permits for oil palm and sugar cane plantations (and the two possible food-crop plantations) occupy almost the whole area allocated for MIFEE. These plantation permits actually cover a larger area, extending beyond the boundaries of the clusters in many areas. Because there is almost no space left, to allocate land for other crops, such as large-scale rice or corn cultivation, local government would need to revoke oil palm or sugar-cane permits.

On the other hand, in almost all cases, industrial forestry plantations are outside the MIFEE clusters.

An important implication of this is that all the past and present planned industrial forestry plantations in Merauke should be considered as additional to MIFEE. All of the various government estimates of the size of MIFEE over the years do not include these forestry concessions, even if the timber is destined to be burnt as an energy source, as is the case with Medco’s plantation.

Between the two major groupings of MIFEE clusters there is a huge swathe of forest that appears to have been set aside for industrial forestry. At present some of the big forestry concession holders are not active, but there appear to be few barriers that would stop others moving in. As Merauke becomes increasingly developed and infrastructure improves, this land could be an attractive proposition for industrial forestry companies. Which means that in the long term, there really could be no forest left.

Map 5: A closer look at currently-active plantation companies within the MIFEE area.

By looking at the plantation companies which are still actively following the bureaucratic steps necessary to start operations within MIFEE clusters we can get an idea of how much land is actually available for agricultural development. This will indicate whether the cultivation of food crops (excluding sugar cane and oil palm) is still a viable possibility in Merauke – ie, MIFEE as it was originally envisaged. To illustrate this, the map of MIFEE clusters is the base, with hatched outlines of the plantations overlaid. Only active plantations are shown:

permits overlaid on clusters

What does that show us? The most striking thing is that after all the plantations have taken their share, there is not so much land left for MIFEE’s food crops plan within the clusters! Even only taking into account the active companies, Remember, oil palm and sugar cane are supposed to be limited to 50% of the area between them. The four clusters inside the oval are the ones to be developed in the short term.

Intended in MIFEE Actual Situation
Cluster 1cluster 1 Dry and wet rice cultivation, corn. 40% OCCUPIED BY ACTIVE PLANTATIONS(65% ALL PLANTATION PERMITS)There is a sizeable chunk of sugar-cane in the Northern part, but there is still some unallocated land. However, the map doesn’t show land which is already owned and cultivated mostly by transmigrant farmers near to Merauke.
Cluster 2cluster2 Sugar cane, livestock, corn, ground nut and soya beans 30% OCCUPIED BY ACTIVE PLANTATIONS(80% ALL PLANTATION PERMITS)Rajawali’s sugar plantations eat up a substantial chunk, and Wilmar is in there too. There are also two plantations which are not listed as active but take up most of the rest of the space (PT Bhakti Agro Lestari and PT Reski Kemilau Berjaya) in this cluster.
Cluster 3cluster3 Corn, ground nut, soybean, fruits and livestock 80% OCCUPIED BY ACTIVE PLANTATIONS(90% ALL PLANTATION PERMITS)Already almost entirely assigned to sugar and oil palm companies.
Cluster 4cluster4 Ground nut, palm, fruits and livestock 85% OCCUPIED BY ACTIVE PLANTATIONS(95% ALL PLANTATION PERMITS)Nearly all allocated to oil palm companies, including the most northerly part around Selil which was originally supposed to be a different cluster, assigned for long term development.
CLUSTERS FOR MEDIUM TERM DEVELOPMENT (2015 -2019)
Cluster 5cluster5 Rice and livestock 80% OCCUPIED BY ACTIVE PLANTATIONS(80% ALL PLANTATION PERMITS)Food crops, most likely cassava, fill almost all this small cluster, but from just one company
Cluster 6cluster6 Fisheries, corn, sago and rice and livestock 0% OCCUPIED BY ACTIVE PLANTATIONS(80% ALL PLANTATION PERMITS)Still empty (although there are non-active permits for sugar cane)
Cluster 7cluster7 Rice, sago and livestock 55% OCCUPIED BY ACTIVE PLANTATIONS(95% ALL PLANTATION PERMITS)Around half the area covered by companies trying to establish sugar-cane plantations
Cluster 8cluster8 Livestock, rice and sago 0% OCCUPIED BY ACTIVE PLANTATIONS(70% ALL PLANTATION PERMITS)Still empty (although this area is now likely to become a conservation area)
Cluster 9cluster9 Corn, ground nut, soybean, rice and livestock 30% OCCUPIED BY ACTIVE PLANTATIONS(95% ALL PLANTATION PERMITS)A big chunk is already being developed for oil palm.

The conclusion is that the scope for food agriculture inside the designated clusters has been severely reduced. Most of these plantation permits were given or renewed within a month of MIFEE’s inauguration ceremony, meaning that almost from day one it was impossible to imagine the scheme proceeding as planned.

It should have been clear three years ago that MIFEE would not be the food estate that would “feed Indonesia, then feed the world”. However since that time the image of a modern and integrated development project has consistently been used to justify new policies that impose a development model on West Papua that offers little that’s positive for the Papuan people, especially rural communities.

“MIFEE isn’t working”

As the promised plan for an integrated food and energy estate floundered, information emerging about MIFEE became increasingly confused and misleading. During 2011 and 2012 articles appeared in the mainstream media on a fairly regular basis, but they were rarely optimistic about the grand plans for Merauke. Some media outlets – notably Tempo magazine4 – did file reports on what was actually going on in Merauke – news of indigenous people being cheated out of their ancestral land. Most articles however, were based on gossip overheard in government and business circles in Jakarta, questions asked at press conferences and so on. These frustrated comments gave an impression that all was not well with the Jakarta version of MIFEE, but they gave a disjointed picture. Here’s a selection, in chronological order:

15/08/2011 “It has been two years since we floated the plan, but there has been no progress at all.” Suswono, the agriculture minister, proposing a new 200,000 hectare food estate in East Kalimantan as a substitute for MIFEE5

26/08/2011 “The news is that the food estate has been postponed. The land that was available before will even be turned into protected forest ” Wilmar Commissioner MP Tumanggor – at that time Wilmar had been hoping for a 200,000 hectare plantation on Dolok Island.6

11/07/2012 “We were planning to have at least 1 million hectares of land, but then the land problems, such as trying to acquire customary land, occurred” Agriculture Ministry’s research and development agency chief, Haryono, saying that the land for MIFEE had been reduced to 200,000 hectares.7

The most frequently mentioned obstacles were the difficulties to obtain indigenous land, environmental impact assessments and permits at the provincial level. Almost invariably these news reports would be based on only one or two sources, were frequently contradictory and certainly were never backed up with maps or data which would give a more complete picture.

These articles created an impression that MIFEE was no longer a big deal, diverting attention away from what was actually happening in Merauke. Accounts of the size of MIFEE are a clear example. While land available for MIFEE was frequently reported as being reduced to 200,000 hectares or 228,000 hectares, this is misleading, as plantation companies have consistently been actively working on developing land several times that area.8

How the food estate myth continues to open the door for plantation development.

All the evidence seems to suggest that MIFEE (the Jakarta Version) has never really got off the ground while MIFEE is alive and kicking. It may seem slightly irrelevant to dwell too much on how and why this occurred. After all, to the dispossessed Malind people, does it really matter if their land was grabbed to make a rice farm or to make a plantation of acacia trees.? Maybe, maybe not. However, the story does not stop there.

The problem is, although MIFEE (Jakarta Version) is currently not much in evidence in Merauke, Jakarta has been reluctant to give up on the idea. Indeed it has become one of the cornerstones of a new national economic strategy and a repositioning of Indonesia’s approach to a troublesome Papua, both driven by the imperative to identify and remove barriers to growth and investment.

This is why Indonesia has been determined to maintain the myth of a modern, integrated project which is vital to national development. However as the government rolls out legislation, infrastructure and incentives to support that slightly fictional project, it is actually the plantation companies awarded permits by John Gluba Gebze that stand to benefit. The myth needs to be maintained – an integrated food project is much easier to justify than the more truthful version, where yet more forest is destroyed for oil palm and industrial forestry. The two versions of MIFEE are locked in an embrace which keeps opening doors to the destruction of Papuan forests.

Masterplan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development (MP3EI)

In May 2011 Indonesia launched a two hundred page document outlining its national economic strategy up to 2025. It is an ambitious plan, aiming to place Indonesia within the world’s ten largest economies by 2025. However in many ways it is far from revolutionary, mostly concentrating on consolidating Indonesia’s existing economic strengths. That means the island of Java is to be further industrialised, while the focus for the rest of the archipelago is to a large extent only extractive and resource industries – mining, plantations and fisheries, albeit with some additional downstream processing to add value. Papua is grouped with Maluku into one of six ‘economic corrridors’ and the key economic activities are copper mining (centred on the Freeport mine in Timika), oil and gas (around Bintuni bay, with a research and development centre in Sorong), nickel mining (in Halmahera, North Maluku) and industrial fisheries (based out of Ambon and Sofifi in Maluku) as well as MIFEE (the Jakarta Version) (obviously).

The information about MIFEE in the document was lifted straight out of the grand design published almost a year previously, seemingly with little update. The map with the ten clusters was reproduced, disregarding the fact that Merauke was already crawling with companies planning their plantations across the boundaries of those carefully-designed clusters.

The importance of MIFEE to this national vision document is highlighted in the introduction which proclaims “With the implementation of MP3EI platform, Indonesia aims to position itself as one of the world’s main food suppliers ” Yet in the MP3EI document, aside from Merauke, the only other area designated for basic food production is in Sulawesi, and details are extremely scant about proposed developments there.

Discussion of MIFEE consumes several pages, but in common with the rest of the MP3EI document, there is no mention of how to tackle any social or environmental problems which might emerge. It is a typical top-down approach which assumes that these questions are not going to be ignored, but they are treated as details that can be worked out later – there is no need to address them in the big masterplan, and certainly no need to build an economic plan which takes people and the environment as its starting point.9

With the inclusion of MIFEE in MP3EI, the food estate was placed firmly back on the political agenda. However, the remote forests of Merauke remain very distant from the land of the glossy reports, which continue to depict a vision of MIFEE that is divergent from the local reality.

MP3EI rescues the rice plan – somewhat.

The Indonesian government is making considerable efforts to ensure the success of MP3EI, and has formed a committee to make sure all the MP3EI’s recommendations are implemented. One of its key mandates is to ensure that the various projects continue to move forward. That means analysing where the barriers to each of the MP3EI projects are and removing them – the word they use is “debottlenecking”. The barriers could be regulations, bureaucracy, lack of infrastructure etc. The intention is that nothing can stand in the way of this particular kind of progress, to prove that MP3EI is “not just business as usual”.

What that means is that MIFEE, as one of the flagship projects in the national plan, and one of the only food agriculture projects, cannot be allowed to fail completely. The team which is assigned to seek out the ‘bottlenecks’ will have to continue to keep one eye focussed on Merauke. If it is the local indigenous landowners which prove to be a bottleneck, then it is within their mandate to find a solution that favours the investment plans.

The MP3EI implementation committee (KP3EI) has taken each of the planned industries and broken them down into individual projects. The aim is to achieve “groundbreaking” (to get started) on each of these projects and then monitor their progress.10

In Merauke, three infrastructure projects are named, Merauke port, the trans-Papua road running along the PNG border, and another road from Merauke to the north-west of the MIFEE area. As well as this there are also two agricultural projects listed. One is to build up agricultural capacity by optimising existing farmland and creating new paddy fields. The other: to develop MIFEE Cluster 1.

This is interesting because it reveals that non-plantation-based agricultural development is still being planned in Merauke. More data was provided by a representative of the agriculture ministry in a presentation on MIFEE to a workshop on MP3EI and low carbon growth organised by Indonesia’s REDD task force. Whilst also noting the progress of the plantation companies, the unnamed presenter gave data on how much land had been optimised and converted to paddy-fields since 2006. A significant increase was seen in 2011 and 2012 according to that data, (3100 hectares optimised and 3400 hectares converted in the two-year period). The list also includes irrigation work, farm roads built and machines bought.11 Of course, this falls far short of MIFEE’s original target of optimising 123,540 ha and converting 299,711 hectares by 2014, but nevertheless it is not a negligible area.

An MP3EI progress report12 was published in March 2013. It listed the four working areas which are the current focus in the Merauke area. They are:

  • Speed up the establishment of a provincial land-use planning regulation in Papua.
  • Speed up up the permissions process of environmental impact assessments
  • Mapping indigenously owned ancestral land in connection with the MIFEE clusters
  • Suggest infrastructure developments to support MIFEE

Once again, the language used clearly indicates that MIFEE must go ahead, and focusses on removing barriers to progress. The first point refers to the lack of a provincial level land-use law which has long been cited as a key reason why MIFEE doesn’t move forward, ever since the previous provincial governor decided in October 2010 that the province would not sanction any new large-scale permits before a comprehensive provincial land-use plan was approved. Environmental impact assessments also need approval at the provincial level. The third point seems particularly callous – inviting indigenous people to map their ancestral land just so that it can be taken away again straight away.

Importantly, if these obstacles can be removed, it will support the development of all forms of agribusiness, whether food estates, oil palm plantations or timber farms, and could potentially also facilitate agribusiness development elsewhere in West Papua.

MP3EI Demands New Laws

The final chapter of the MP3EI document deals with how the plan is to be implemented and includes a list of several new pieces of legislation which would need to be created to facilitate the national economic plan. A few were of relevance to MIFEE:

“Review Law and Government Regulations related to the application of communal land (tanah ulayat) as an investment component which will enable the land owners to gain higher economic benefits. (this review is needed to support the MIFEE program). ” (target December 2011)

“Issue regulations to encourage infrastructure development in the eastern part of Indonesia.” (target December 2011)

“Issue regulations regarding Forestry Moratorium. ” (target July 2011)

“Issue regulations regarding incentive/facilitation to accelerate investment in centres of agricultural production, animal husbandry, and fishery industries.” (target August 2011)

As with the infrastructure and project development, these targets for legislation are also monitored. An update on progress13 was published on a government website in March 2012, checking off new laws and regulations against the targets in the MP3EI document. The first three of the points were marked as ‘resolved’. So let’s have a closer look at the laws they created:

Law on land in the public interest

Carefully worded to sound benign, the first point, supposedly to allow indigenous landowners to get greater benefit, has actually become a powerful piece of legislation that will allow the state to appropriate land all over the archipelago, regardless of whether people hold indigenous rights or not. The 2012 Law on the Supply of Land in the Public Interest, (UU 2 Tahun 2012) is actually a law to regulate the compulsory purchase of land for development projects. Those development projects include infrastructure (road, rail, ports, airports, electricity distribution), oil and gas, dams, nature reserves and national security and defence, amongst others. In other words, a law which could encourage rampant land-grabbing nationwide.

MIFEE was the justification for this law when it was mentioned in the MP3EI document. In Merauke however, it’s effects will be limited, because in the end, neither agriculture nor plantations make it on to the list of land uses which require compulsory purchase. It will only affect indigenous landowners whose land is wanted for infrastructure projects connected to MIFEE, especially ports and roads, whether they are state projects, or funded by private investors.

It is worth pointing out that this law was already being planned before the MP3EI report was published. Linking this controversial law which has little relevance to Merauke explicitly to the MIFEE project, and describing it in a way which makes it sound beneficial to indigenous people, is an interesting way to conceal its real purpose. It seems that this has been an example of using the pretext of supporting a supposedly vital food security project in order to push through an unpopular piece of legislation.

The Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua: UP4B

The second point on the list above, infrastructure development in the East of Indonesia, was dealt with in two Presidential Regulations issued in September 2011, which clearly also had the dual aim of weakening support for Papuan independence. Presidential Regulation 65 was a kind of action plan to ‘speed up development’ in the two Papuan provinces, and Presidential Regulation 66 set up the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B), the institution that would oversee the implementation of that program.

The impetus for this new development program can clearly be seen as being linked to MIFEE and MP3EI. One of the nine development strategies outlined in Presidential Regulation 65 is to develop a “competitive economy by developing economic clusters in strategic zones with a focus on MP3EI’s Papua-Maluku corridor”. Merauke is one of six of these strategic zones, alongside Jayapura, Mimika, Biak, Manokwari and Sorong. Other relevant strategic aims include improving transportation and other infrastructure, improving functional links between the different levels of government and promoting development in accordance with local, regional and national land-use plans. All of these aims can be interpreted as gearing Papua up for more top-down development.

However, the UP4B’s mandate goes far beyond preparing Papua for MP3EI projects. Amongst its other aims are fixing the woeful neglect of Papua’s rural health and education services, affirmative action for ethnic Papuans through quotas for study outside Papua and in the military/police, mapping the sources of political and human rights problems and so on.

These two regulations cannot be seen only as an attempt to build up the West Papuan economy but also need to be understood in the context of West Papua’s political situation at the time. There had been a special autonomy law for ten years, but it was widely regarded as a failure. The Indonesian government and security forces had refused to respect or implement many important provisions of that law, and special autonomy funds had merely fertilized corruption amongst the Papuan political elite, hurting the general population in many ways.

Urban social movements were mobilising more and more effectively. While on one hand the West Papua National Committee was calling huge demonstrations in support of an independence referendum, the Papua Peace Network was promoting the idea of dialogue to address West Papua’s problems at a fundamental level. Even the Papuan People’s Council (MRP), a governmental body created by the special autonomy law, had voted to symbolically ‘return’ that law to the government as an utter failure. The West Papuan conflict was receiving more and more attention internationally, with growing public sympathy for the independence cause as news of human rights abuses circulated more widely.

Some kind of action was needed, and so the President, unwilling to bow to any demands for meaningful change which involved the Papuan people’s participation, unilaterally created the UP4B. This new unit seeks to rebuild trust in the Indonesian state by focusing on economic welfare – the idea being that economic development will make people forget about all historical and structural injustices they have experienced. Evidently this approach ignores all the many complex reasons for the problems in West Papua connected to politics, history, militarism, demographics, racism and so on.

UP4B aims to win Papuans over by promoting local development such as schools, clinics, food security programs and village enterprise, much of which is indeed sorely needed. But behind that mask of supposed social responsibility it is also promoting MP3EI’s top-down development agenda. All of this is delivered as decreed by Jakarta, and Papuan people at no time are given the opportunity to decide how they want to be ‘developed’.

In fact despite the image it projects as purely development-orientated, UP4B is an overtly political project. Its vision statement, just one sentence long, clearly states that it wants to make Papuans proud to be an integral part of the Indonesian nation. Unsurprisingly, there are few signs that the UP4B has been greeted with much enthusiasm by Papuan people.

When President SBY set up the UP4B, he also chose the man he wanted to do the job. Retired General Bambang Darmono headed Indonesia’s forces in Aceh from 2002-2005, in a conflict that the Indonesian Human Rights Commission has recently described as a gross human rights violation.14 The choice of a non-Papuan military man with experience of combating independence movements sends a strong message that this unit is only concerned with furthering Jakarta’s will in West Papua

UP4B and MIFEE.

The UP4B’s website has not had much to say about MIFEE, preferring to concentrate on the higher-propaganda-value stories of affirmative action and education programs. The unit has only posted one article describing a visit to an unnamed MIFEE oil palm plantation by a UP4B reporter.15

Being image conscious is one reason why UP4B chooses to say little about controversial projects such as MIFEE. The unit is also not involved at the village level, it’s role is to create a favorable investment climate, so much of its work is unseen by the public. However, the unit was given a definite mandate to facilitate MIFEE when it was created. Details are given in two appendices to Presidential Regulation 65/2011 which make up the Action Plan. The first is a list of ‘quick wins’ to be implemented in 2011-2014 and includes 52 points connected to the MP3EI plan. In Merauke this includes:

  • The trans-Papua road.
  • Road from Kumb-Okaba-Nakias
  • Road from Merauke – Muting
  • Continue building ocean fishing port in Merauke
  • Road from Okaba – Wambi
  • Build a port at Bade (on Digul River)
  • Build a port administration building in Merauke
  • Optimise and extend agricultural land in Merauke regency
  • Supply agricultural machinery (tractors, planters, reapers, threshers, mini-combines, water pumps
  • Build 100m cargo wharf at Merauke port
  • Develop fertilizer processing and biogas industries
  • Develop educational support sector
  • Provide capital for capacity building in the community and to develop investment
  • Build a village breeding centre for beef cattle
  • Build agribusiness terminals, warehousing and export ports at Serapuh and Wogikel
  • Bridges over the Koloy and Hewa rivers, and the Inggun swamp
  • Extend Merauke’s Mopah airport

The central government would foot the bill for all those developments.

The second appendix to Presidential Regulation 66 of 2012 is the Comprehensive Action Plan which is more general, mostly expanding on the UP4B’s strategic aims. MIFEE is in there of course, and the plan also includes providing incentives for investment in the strategic zones it identified, which include Merauke. There is also a plan to make Merauke a ‘minapolitan’ – a concept which Indonesia has developed which means applying the principles of integrated agribusiness to fisheries. This is an idea which has been on the table since before MIFEE was launched.16

It is not the UP4B itself that will carry out the points on this action plan. It’s mandate is as an overseer: to make sure Papua stays on track with the top-down development model that MP3EI has decreed. This nevertheless makes it a very powerful organisation designed to impose Jakarta’s vision for development on Papua, in Jakarta’s interest, and with virtually no participation from the people of Papua.

Presidential Regulation 40/2013: Military to build new roads.

Another piece of legislation, which the President decreed in May 2013, is also intended to support infrastructure development guided by MP3EI. Presidential Regulation 40/2013 allocates central funding for the construction of a network of roads across Papua. Most controversially, many of these roads are to be built by the military.

The road network (called Roads to Accelerate Development in Papua and West Papua or P4B) is clearly a product of the same thinking that produced MIFEE, MP3EI and the UP4B. The road network is clearly seen to follow the MP3EI corridor, building a frontier road from Merauke to Jayapura and then through the central highlands to access Nabire and Timika, passing near both the Freeport mine and the gold-rich areas of Paniai in the Western Highlands. Another road along the north coast passes Sarmi which is currently the site of oil and gas exploration, and on to the Bird’s Head peninsula where it meets the other oil and gas nodes in Bintuni Bay and Sorong.17

peta-pembangunan-jalan perpres 40

Around Merauke, the roads include the border road and roads connecting the coast to the north-west (Wanam) and northern (Nakias areas).

One of the most controversial aspects of Presidential Regulation 40/2013 is that about half of the roads will be built by the military. Those roads tend to be in mountainous areas where geographical conditions are difficult, or in zones prone to conflict. This increased military presence is greatly worrying as it can be expected to bring several problems. Even if outright violent conflict does not occur, it is inevitable that local people living close to the road-building areas will feel afraid and intimidated. The Indonesian military in Papua is also often accused of discriminatory and prejudiced behaviour toward local people, raping women (even when the soldiers believe the relationship is consensual, often indigenous women are just too scared of repercussion towards them or their community to refuse), running prostitution, gambling and alcohol businesses, illegal businesses selling wood, forest animals or forest products, and so on.

Announcing the new regulation, the deputy head of the UP4B Eduard Fontanaba said that the UP4B was involved in its design – indeed it had been struggling for around six months to bring it to fruition.18 In other words, an institution led by a retired general has proposed bringing the army in to build roads to promote industrial development. The military stands to earn 425 billion Rupiah from the project. Whether this implies that the army is acting out of economic motives (to expand its business activities), or whether the plan is part of a political strategy to ensure the continuing militarisation of Papua, it is a clear sign that military might will play an important role in pushing forward development.19

MIFEE Ploughs through the Forestry Moratorium.

In 2011 Indonesia made a deal with Norway where in exchange for US$ 1 billion, Indonesia would impose a moratorium on new permits to clear primary forest and peatland for two years. The reasoning was that Indonesia was effectively one of the highest contributors to climate change worldwide due to rampant deforestation, and a two year moratorium could break the pattern and allow a new paradigm of resource use to be developed.

After months of delay and uncertainty the moratorium was finally signed on 20th May 2011. By that time Indonesia had managed to negotiate several exceptions, for nationally important projects, in line with the MP3EI target industries. Land intended for rice and sugar cane cultivation was included as one of the exceptions, surely with a nod to MIFEE, and with the reasoning that Indonesia needed to ensure self-sufficiency in those two crops. In reality, MIFEE has effectively managed to squeeze more land out of the moratorium’s protection.

Every six months, the moratorium map has been updated. Around Merauke this means that huge swathes of land have been cut from the map and no longer enjoy this protection. The biggest cut was in the first revision. Most of the eastern part of the MIFEE area (clusters 5,6,7 and 9) are covered with peatland. The peat is not especially deep, data collected in 2001 estimated it as between 50-100 cm, but it is the second largest area of peatland in Papua, after the Asmat swamps. It is also mostly primary forest.

The area was marked as peatland on the original moratorium map, but by the time the first revision was published, the area was blank again. Greenomics highlighted the differences on a map.20

difference between moratorium map and first revision

The whole pink peat area has been cut from the moratorium! A lot of it was inside MIFEE clusters, or the other areas which have also got permits that border them to the east. It looks very much as if the map was altered to accommodate MIFEE, although the forestry service never gives explanations for why particular changes are made.

Given that Indonesia has insisted on exemptions for rice and sugar-cane, does this mean it is legitimate to cut the area from the map? According to the MIFEE (Jakarta Version) plan, the land was designated for mixed farming, including some rice, but also other crops which are not exempt from the moratorium. On the other hand, all the plantation permits which have been given in the area are for sugar cane, which does qualify for an exemption. Surely the proper procedure in such cases would be to allow permits to grow these exempted crops (rice or sugar cane), and withhold them for other crops, not just wipe it off the map entirely. If an area is excluded from the map completely then the government is free to give out permits for whichever use it pleases.

Oil palm is most certainly not eligible for an exception to the moratorium. But in a later revision of the moratorium map (the moratorium was renewed in 2013) several areas of primary forest have been excluded from the MIFEE clusters that are intended for oil palm. In the map below the black areas indicate land that has been excised from the moratorium map around MIFEE cluster 4. The map is overlaid with the oil palm permits that have already been issued. The map clearly shows that a considerable area of primary forest has been removed from the moratorium map. This includes about half of PT Central Cipta Murdaya’s concession, and smaller areas included in PT Agriprima Cipta Persada, PT Agrinusa Persada Mulia, PT Hardaya Sugar Papua and PT Hardaya Sawit Papua.

moratorium map changes

Opening new frontiers.

Could it ever have been possible in a few short years to convert a vast forested wilderness with virtually no infrastructure into a vibrant centre for high-tech agro-industry? A disciplined centrally-planned authoritarian state such as China might have managed it but in Indonesia it always seemed a bit implausible. But the act of presenting that dream has opened this frontier to the same crowd of logging and plantation companies that has already devastated Sumatra and Kalimantan. The food estate is still hanging on, but considerably less ambitious than originally planned

Maybe that is the nature of a frontier – first come the pioneers, whose crude methods carry risks but can bring high returns, and then more infrastructure-dependent enterprises move in when conditions are right. So maybe high-tech rice cultivation will make it to Merauke some day. Or maybe just more oil palm. One way or another, the Malind people are facing a severe upheaval to their traditional way of life, which as they well know, is unlikely to do them any good.


  1. http://www.suarapembaruan.com/pages/e-paper/2013/07/27/files/assets/basic-html/page19.html 
  2. Gluba Gebze has been accused of corruption, although unrelated to the MIFEE project. He was arrested on 16th September 2013 under suspicion of Rp 18.5 billion (US$1.6 million) worth of corruption involving crocodile skin souvenirs. 
  3. These figures are mostly based on the size of the initial location permits issued by the Merauke local government. Plantation permits (izin usaha perkebunan) are usually slightly smaller, but many companies have not obtained this permit yet and in other cases it’s size is unknown. Where IUP figures are available, they have been used in this calculation. 
  4. http://tapol.gn.apc.org/reports/120415_Tempo_report.pdf 
  5. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/indonesia-turns-back-on-papua-food-bowl-plan/459493/ 
  6. http://www.suarakarya-online.com/news.html?id=285764 
  7. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/12/merauke-food-estate-land-likely-shrink-80.html 
  8. The figure of 228,000 hectares appears to have arisen for the first time in March 2011, as the amount of land that was apparently already free of any restrictions to do with indigenous ownership or forest status. The location of this 228,000 hectares has not been published. http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/03/30/03520963  
  9. Indeed the only mention of local people is the need for “Socialization to the local community about the implementation and benefits of the MIFEE program for the welfare of the community”. The word ‘socialisation’ is commonly used in Indonesian but less so in English – it basically means presenting plans to the community. Clearly the philosophy is a long way distant from the principle of Free Prior and Informed Consent which should be a minimum benchmark for any proposal of development on indigenous land. Papua’s low population density is mentioned as an obstacle for development, but the impact potentially millions of new migrants would have on the local population and culture also goes unmentioned. 
  10. A fairly uninformative overview of the status of each project can be viewed on their website, www.kp3ei.go.id 
  11. http://www.redd-indonesia.org/pdf/seminar/Merauke/04_Kementan_MIFEE.pdf 
  12. http://www.kp3ei.go.id/uploads_file/20130617095359.Bab%206%20Perkembangan%20Pelaksanaan%20MP3EI%20KE%20Papua-Maluku_16%20MEI.pdf 
  13. http://www.setkab.go.id/mp3ei-3938-27-regulasi-telah-diterbitkan-untuk-sukseskan-mp3ei.html 
  14. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/02/military-operation-aceh-was-gross-human-rights-violation.html 
  15. He observed local people working for the company, and shows a worryingly superficial understanding of indigenous people’s complex relationship with progress when he states that ‘of course’ they welcome the development as it has brought roads, meaning they don’t have to spend days walking to leave the area. However this information is from the company, he has not noted whether he actually spoke with any villagers. http://www.up4b.go.id/index.php/prioritas-p4b/8-ekonomi/item/227-puluhan-ribu-polybag-disulap-menjadi-kebun-kelapa-sawit 
  16. http://www.kkp.go.id/index.php/arsip/c/2577/Minapolitan-di-Food-Estate-Merauke/?category_id=62 
  17. map sourced from http://zonadamai.wordpress.com/2013/06/03/inilah-ruas-jalan-strategis-nasional-papua-papua-barat-yang-akan-dibangun-tni-2/  
  18. http://www.up4b.go.id/index.php/prioritas-p4b/4-hukum-dan-ham/item/424-perpres-nomor-40-tahun-2013-solusi-membuka-isolasi-papua 
  19. http://www.up4b.go.id/index.php/berita/media-massa/item/570-tni-siap-bangun-14-ruas-jalan-di-papua-ksad-minta-tambahan-waktu  
  20. http://www.greenomics.org/docs/Report_201202_Merauke_Food_and_Energy_Estate.pdf 

Planned MSG Foreign Ministers visit to West Papua lacks transparency

Exclusive investigation from West Papua Media team

October 12, 2013

(The Hague): As allegations surface of Indonesian military-linked businessmen providing envelopes of “hefty cash” to senior officials in the Solomon Island’s Prime Ministerial delegation during the recent APEC summit in Bali, a high level source inside the Melanesian Spearhead Group has raised concerns over Indonesia’s subversion of the agreed visit of Melanesian Foreign Ministers to West Papua, in an exclusive interview with West Papua Media.

An explosive but carefully worded article in the Solomon Star newspaper on October 11 has alleged that Indonesian officials provided members of Solomon Islands government with large amounts of cash contained in yellow envelopes, during an official dinner hosted in honour of the Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo and his delegation.

According to the Solomon Star report, at least five members of the delegation have admitted to receiving the payments, amongst a total of 17 delegation members alleged to have received the envelopes.  The report, from interviews by journalist Alfred Sasako with a highly placed whistleblower in Honiara, alleged that at least two “names withheld” senior officials received USD$25, 000 each, three others received USD$10, 000  and a final two delegation members received USD$5, 000 each respectively.

“It seems the level of payment is based on seniority, the higher you are, the more you get,” the sources told the Solomon Star.

After the publication of the new allegations, West Papua Media spoke on Saturday to a well-respected customary figure in the Solomon Islands, who described the latest revelations as proof of long-standing suspicions “that Indonesia is involved in a corrupt subversion of Melanesian solidarity on the West Papua issue.  The source described the behaviour of Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo in arranging unilateral visits to West Papua as “an affront to the Melanesian Way that is deliberately undermining the quality of what a properly constituted MSG Fact-finding mission can uncover in West Papua.”

“The Prime Minster is siding with Indonesia to cover up the crimes against the West Papuan people, by diluting the effectiveness of a multilateral fact-finding team to assess the real situation in West Papua.  What other deals is he doing for the Solomon Islands with these Indonesian military businessmen?  Are our islands going to be the next West Papua?” the source told WPM.   The customary source, who had no involvement with the Solomon Star revelations, declined to be identified for this article citing fears of being labelled as the whistleblower.

“This is not about me anyway, this about the questions for all Melanesian people about how far Indonesia is willing to bully or bribe Melanesians, and how some Melanesians like our Prime Minister are potentially having their pockets lined with blood money for turning their backs on the suffering of our Melanesian family in West Papua,” the source told WPM with some indignation.

Prior to the MSG meeting in Noumea in June 2013 the Indonesian and Fijian governments agreed to a multi-lateral visit to West Papua by MSG Foreign Ministers. The proposal was raised at the Noumea meeting by Fiji in part to defer a decision over whether West Papua would be granted membership into the MSG or not. The MSG Ministerial team has undertaken to write a report following their visit. This report will then help guide the MSG’s decision regarding West Papua’s membership. Since June, however, serious doubts have been raised as to how transparent the organising of the MSG Foreign Ministers is, or even whether it will happen at all.

A high-level source inside the MSG who was at the meeting in Noumea but asked not to be named told WPM  on condition of anonymity, that it was highly unlikely that the MSG will revoke Indonesia’s observer status, but that they could give West Papua ‘associative status’, which is a higher level of membership. However, the source then went on to say that it is now “not clear what is happening”.

The concerns are serious. First, no date has been set for the Foreign Ministers visit to West Papua. Second, neither the MSG Secretariat nor Melanesian nations are organising the visit. “The Foreign Ministers all rely on an invitation from the Indonesian government. It is not clear if such an invitation has been issued and it is not clear who will pay for it. My advice to member countries is that each Melanesian country pays for their own visit themselves” said the senior MSG bureaucrat. “That way the Foreign Ministers will not be beholden to the Indonesian government and that their status as independent advisors to the MSG is more likely to be guaranteed.”

Most concerning is that the idea of a multi-lateral visit could be abandoned. “It is possible” said the MSG official “that the foreign ministers could travel to West Papua separately and not as a group”.  This is the most likely possibility given the revelations in the Solomon Star.

Although privately many Melanesian politicians support independence for West Papua the official cautioned against false hopes. “West Papuans should not have high expectations from the forthcoming MSG foreign ministers support.”

At this stage it appears highly unlikely that the Melanesian foreign ministers report will reflect the political reality inside West Papua or the aspirations of the West Papuan people.  This view is reflected in the recent comments from Mr Gordon Lilo, the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, who told Indonesia’s Antara state news agency that he is “impressed with the progress” the Indonesian government has made in West Papua.  Mannaseh Sogovare, the Solomon Islands opposition leader, criticised Lilo’s comments saying that he had “probably been overwhelmed by the reception of the hosts and obviously the Indonesians have gone out of their way to put on the wow factor to make sure that Lilo is wooed out of any views that he may have had in support of West Papuan membership of the MSG,” reported Radio New Zealand.

Comment about the corruption of the Fact-Finding process has also been repeatedly sought by West Papua Media from the office of Vanuatu Prime Minister Moana Carcasses, however the Prime Minister was unavailable to comment on the allegations.  However, Carcasses issued a historic and moral challenge to the international community at the United Nations General Assembly in New York in late September, by calling for the appointment of a Special Representative to investigate historical and ongoing of human rights abuses by Indonesia.

‘How can we then ignore hundreds of thousands of West Papuans who have been beaten and murdered? The people of West Papua are looking to the UN as a beacon of hope… Let us, my colleague leaders, with the same moral conviction, yield our support to the plight of West Papuans. It is time for the United Nations to move beyond its periphery and address and rectify some historical errors,” Carcasses told the UN General Assembly.

These are the words that Melanesian leaders may well be reflecting on as they ponder the ramifications of accepting Indonesia’s subversion of the MSG Fact Finding Team process.

As well as sharing his concerns, the senior MSG official also had some practical advice for Papuan leaders. “All of us at the MSG are observing very closely developments inside West Papua. In order for us to assist the West Papuan application for membership Papuan leaders need to present a unified position that is backed up by strong support from civil society. The good news is that there is moral support from inside the MSG. Even senior leaders in the United Nations privately recognise that West Papua is an occupation.”

However, without unity of purpose from West Papuan leaders and strong grassroots support from inside Melanesian countries, the Indonesian government could out-manoeuver West Papua again.

WestPapuaMedia team